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INTRODUCTION 
Martin E. P. Seligtnan's "learned helplessness" theory of 
depression states that laboratory-induced learned helplessness (e.g., 
Maier & Seligman, 1976) provides a model for normally-occurring 
psychological depression in humans (Seligman, 1975; Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). According to the theory, helplessness 
and some cases of depression are alike both behaviorally and 
functionally. Indeed, they are regarded as two cases of the same 
phenomenon, "helplessness depression": 
There is continuity of miniature helplessness depression 
created in the laboratory and . . . real-life depression . . . 
the laboratory-induced depressions are less chronic and less 
global and are capable of being reversed by debriefing, but, 
we hypothesize, they are not different in kind from naturally 
occurring helplessness depressions. They differ only quanti­
tatively . . . (Abramson et al., 1978, 67-68). 
The present study is one test of this model. It focuses on 
affect, one aspect of both helplessness and depression. Helplessness 
has been thoroughly described and researched in laboratory studies 
with animals and with humans (see Maier & Seligman, 1976, and 
Seligman, 1975, for reviews). Seligman's theory of depression was 
built on his observation that the effects of helplessness parallel 
some of the frequently reported symptoms of depression. A difficulty 
with the model, however, is that the affective component of learned 
helplessness has received relatively slight attention in both theory 
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and research. Yet depression is viewed as primarily an affective, 
or mood disorder, both historically and currently (e.g., Freud, 1917; 
Kraepelin, 1921; Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, 1980). 
The helplessness model of depression is incomplete at best, relevant 
to only a portion of the clinical picture of depression, until its 
affective dimension is clearly and reliably demonstrated. The first 
purpose of this research was to describe the quality of the emotion 
which accompanies laboratory-induced helplessness, and to compare 
this with the emotion which characterizes depression. 
The second research question was whether attributions mediate 
emotion in learned helplessness. According to Abramson et al. 
(1978), attributions about the cause of helplessness may influence 
the intensity of emotion which the helpless individual experiences, 
but qualitative variations in emotion are not mentioned. Other 
recent work (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978), however, shows that 
attributions do alter the quality of emotional experience following 
success or failure. Since laboratory helplessness is usually 
induced by a series of failure experiences, these results may 
extend to the case of helplessness. If so, only certain attributions 
would produce emotion in helplessness which is analogous to the 
emotion of depression, and Seligman's theory may be in need of 
revision or expansion. A given attributional style may be necessary 
for producing the emotion specific to depression. 
The present study, then, focused on two questions: (1) the 
quality of the emotion which accompanies helplessness and its 
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similarity to the emotion of depression; and (2) whether attributions 
mediate the emotion of helplessness. A comprehensive assessment of 
the quality of the emotional changes which accompany helplessness 
has not been previously undertaken. Likewise, the role of 
attributions on emotions in helplessness has not been successfully 
studied. Both questions directly address the adequacy of Seligman's 
model in describing and accounting for the emotional component of 
depression. 
The Iowa State University Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects in Research reviewed this project and concluded that the 
rights and welfare of the human subjects were adequately protected, 
that risks were outweighed by the potential benefits and expected 
value of the knowledge sought, that confidentiality of data was 
assured and that informed consent was obtained by appropriate 
procedures. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Learned Helplessness and Depression: The Theory 
The major contention of this thesis is that the helplessness 
model of depression is weak in that a similarity of affect in 
laboratory helplessness and real-world depression remains to be 
demonstrated. This weakness stems in part from the fact that early 
work with helplessness focused on its motivational and cognitive 
properties, and only recently has an emotional component been 
proposed (Seligman, 1975). Hence, scant research is accumulated on 
emotion in helplessness. In the following sections, helplessness 
theory and research are reviewed, with particular attention given 
to that which described and measured affect. The theory is 
presented first, in both its original and recently expanded versions. 
The earliest theoretical statement pertained only to laboratory 
helplessness. Later ones related helplessness to human depression. 
Uncontrollability 
The phrase "learned helplessness" was coined by Seligman and 
colleagues to describe the unusual learning behavior of dogs after 
they had been exposed to uncontrollable electric shock. These 
animals were later grossly deficient in shuttlebox escape/avoidance 
learning, and helplessness theory arose to account for this effect. 
Uncontrollability is operationally defined as a situation where 
the probability (p) of reinforcement (RF) given any specific response 
(R) equals the probability of reinforcement in the absence of that 
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response (R). Thus, uncontrollability refers to a condition of 
noncontingency between responding and reward, and is defined by the 
equation, p(RF/R) = p(RF/'R) (Seligman, Maier, & Solomon, 1971). When 
this noncontingency applies to all emitted responses, the situation 
is an uncontrollable one. Organisms are free to emit various 
responses under helplessness conditions, and indeed reinforcement may 
occur. However, the delivery of the reinforcement is predetermined 
and random; its parameters (including frequency, density, intensity, 
and duration) are under experimenter control and unrelated in any 
lawful way to responding by the organism. 
It is important to note that uncontrollability is defined by 
the experimenter's arrangement, not by the perceptions of the subject 
(Seligman, Maier, & Solomon, 1971). Yet, the crux of helplessness 
theory is that organisms perceive and actively learn that responses 
are independent of outcomes (Seligman, 1975; Maier & Seligman, 1976). 
In short, they learn that they are helpless, or develop an expectancy 
of no control. Later, in situations which involve controllable 
outcomes [i.e., p(RF/F f p(RF/ÏÏ)] , if the expectancy of noncontrol 
persists, organisms continue to respond as if their behavior is 
irrelevant to their outcomes. They do not emit appropriate, 
reinforcement-controlling responses (i.e., they show a "motivational 
deficit"). Furthermore, if an appropriate response is emitted and 
rewarded, they do not learn from it. That is, they apparently fail 
to recognize new contingencies, a phenomenon referred to as the 
"cognitive deficit." 
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Attributions in learned helplessness and depression 
Recently Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) reformulated 
helplessenss theory in a manner which gives major importance to 
attributions. In the revision, the perception and expectancy of 
response-outcome independence was retained as the critical factor 
leading to the motivational and cognitive effects in helplessness. 
However, it was hypothesized that in humans attributions intervene 
between the perception of noncontingency and the formation of one's 
expectancy for control, and determine the parameters of the helpless­
ness deficits. 
The sequence of events in the development of helplessness is 
depicted in Figure 1, taken from Abramson et al. (1978, p. 52). 
Objective noncontingency-»Perception of present and past 
noncontingency^Attributions for present or past noncon­
tingency-» Expectation of future noncontingency->Symptoms 
of helplessness. 
Figure 1. Flow of events leading to symptoms of helplessness 
According to this model, when humans perceive helplessness, they 
automatically question why they are helpless, and form an explanation, 
or causal attribution. Attributions may vary along the dimensions 
of generality, stability, and locus of control. [The latter two 
reflect the work of Weiner and colleagues in achievement motivation 
(Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum, 1971).] In 
helplessness, the kind of attribution one makes presumably 
determines the generality (across situations) and chronicity (over 
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time) of the helplessness effects, and whether self-esteem is 
lowered. The three dimensions are considered orthogonal, and 
involved in all attributions about helplessness. Except for the 
locus of control dimension, the authors did not offer guidelines on 
when various types of attributions would be made. 
The attributional dimensions act in the following ways: If 
a very specific attribution is made, helplessness beliefs will not 
generalize across situations, and symptoms will not occur except 
in the specific situation where helplessness was originally experi­
enced. More global attributions occasion more widely-reaching 
effects. At the extreme, persons may experience helplessness in 
all situations. 
The stability of the attribute determines the chronicity of 
helplessness deficits. Following from Weiner et al. (1971), 
Abramson et al. (1978) hypothesized that attributions of help­
lessness to a stable element, such as low ability or one's sex, lead 
to persistent deficits over time. Conversely, invoking an unstable 
element (e.g., being dizzy, not trying) causes helplessness to 
dissipate more rapidly. 
The internal-external (locus of control) dimension mediates 
self-esteem changes. Whether one forms an internal or an external 
attribution is thought to depend on how his or her performance 
compares with that of relevant others. If one experiences help­
lessness in a situation where relevant peers are also helpless, 
the attribution will be an external one—for example, to task 
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difficulty, universal bad luck, or the intervention of a third 
party. The ensuing state is dubbed "universal helplessness," 
and does not entail a lowering of self-esteem. If, however, 
helplessness is experienced relative to an outcome which 
controllable by relevant others (e.g., failing a bar exam which 
one's classmates pass) the resultant attribution is an internal one. 
The individual experiences "personal helplessness," which involves 
lowered self-esteem. The self-esteem deficit is considered a 
fourth helplessness deficit, in addition to motivational, cognitive, 
and emotional deficits (the latter will be discussed momentarily), 
but is specific to personal helplessness. 
To this point the revised theory has been discussed in terms 
of helplessness. All of the above remarks apply to the theory 
of depression as well, in that according to the model, helplessness 
essentially i^ depression. It is hypothesized that depression 
follows from the recognition of a lack of control over important 
life events. Generality and chronicity of depression are presumed 
to follow from the globality and specificity of attributions about 
the cause of one's lack of control, and self-esteem diminishes 
when an internal attribution is made. 
Emotion in learned helplessness and depression 
As has been mentioned, the original helplessness experiments 
revealed shuttlebox learning deficits in dogs after exposure to 
uncontrollable shock. For several years, from 1967 to 1975, help­
lessness literature focused on describing the motivational and 
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cognitive learning deficits in animals and humans, and researching 
the conditions which produced them. In 1975, Seligman theorized 
that helplessness also produces depressed affect. At the same 
time, he theorized that helplessness is a laboratory analog of human 
depression. Seligman proposed that an organism's initial emotional 
reaction to aversive stimulation is a "heightened state of emotion­
ality that can loosely be called fear" (p. 53). For a time, the fear 
is adaptive in that it motivates the organism to search for a way 
to escape. If an escape is found, fear is reduced and the organism 
rather calmly goes about escaping or avoiding. However, if the trau­
matic stimulation is uncontrollable, fear is maladaptive. It leads 
to the expenditure of great amounts of energy to no avail. Seligman 
proposed that when an organism realizes the uncontrollability of 
the situation, it ceases its search for escape. Concomitantly, 
fear is replaced by depression. 
In the 1978 revision, Abramson et al. modified Seligman's 
1975 statement about affect in helplessness in several ways. First, 
they proposed that helplessness does not always involve depressed 
affect. Uncontrollability alone, they maintained, is insufficient 
to produce sad affect. For example, the delivery of uncontrollable 
reward does not result in dysphoria. Therefore, the authors 
proposed that an uncontrollable situation must involve either the 
loss of a highly desired outcome or the occurrence of a highly 
aversive one in order for emotional effects to occur in the resultant 
helplessness. In short, the outcome must be bad. The quality 
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of the emotion was not described by Abramson et al. except as it 
was referred to as "depressed affect," "sadness," "dysphoria," 
and "negative affect" (p. 65). In contrast with Seligman (1975), they 
made no mention of a preceding fear state. 
Expanding on Seligman's (1975) original statement, the revised 
theory states that the chief determinant of the intensity of affect 
in helplessness is the subjective importance of the uncontrollable 
outcome (its desirability or aversiveness). Intensity of affect 
may also be affected by the certainty of the expectation that 
the outcome is controllable, and, following from Weiner (1974), "may 
also depend on whether the person views his helplessness as universal 
or personal" (Abramson et al., 1978, p. 65). Thus, internality of 
the attributed cause may heighten the negative affect. However, it 
is not expected that the quality of the emotional experience varies 
depending on the attributed cause. To account for the intense sad 
affect of depression, as well as the low self-esteem and chronicity 
of effects, Abramson et al. proposed that depressives make internal, 
global, and stable attributions about their helplessness. 
To summarize, according the revised helplessness theory, 
depressed affect occurs in helplessness when the uncontrollable 
outcome is a negative one. Uncontrollability per se does lead to 
motivational and cognitive deficits, but not the affect of depression. 
Intensity of the affective response depends upon a number of factors, 
but it appears from Abramson's et al. discussion that when affect 
accompanies helplessness, its quality does not vary from one instance 
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to the next. It should be noted that depressed affect may accompany 
either personal or universal helplessness since each can involve 
aversive outcomes. Thus, affect and self-esteem are thought to vary 
independently according to this model. 
Learned Helplessness: The Evidence 
In the following sections the research on helplessness is 
reviewed. As has been mentioned, early research focused almost 
exclusively on motivational and cognitive effects. This literature 
will be mentioned first, but handled quite briefly. More attention 
is given to the much lesser quantity of research which addressed 
emotional effects. Many of the most important helplessness studies 
have been done with animals. This literature is of minimal usefulness 
to the present discussion of affect, so will be described only as it 
is necessary to illustrate the methodology which became paradigmatic 
in helplessness research, and to describe the classic "motivational" 
and "cognitive" effects. 
Motivational and cognitive effects 
Animal studies. The original studies of learned helplessness, 
which were to provide the model for both animal and the early human 
research, were conducted on dogs in Seligman's animal learning 
laboratory (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 1967). In 
the first study naive adult dogs were suspended in a rubberized cloth 
hammock containing four holes through which their legs hung down 
and were secured. Their heads were held in place by two panels 
12 
with a yoke between them placed across the dogs' necks. Brass 
electrodes were attached to the hind footpads of animals in the 
experimental groups, through which a series of at least 64 
uncontrollable shocks of varying duration and density were adminis­
tered. One day later escape-avoidance learning was tested in a two-
way shuttlebox, the two compartments separated by a partition 
adjusted to shoulder height of the dog. A CS of decreased illumina­
tion in the shuttlebox was followed ten seconds later by the onset 
of electric shock through the grid floor. Jumping the barrier 
after the onset of shock allowed subjects to escape, whereas jumping 
during the ten-second CS-UCS onset interval allowed them to avoid 
shock altogether. 
Results showed that animals exposed to shock, regardless of 
density and duration, were significantly slower to avoid and escape 
than dogs receiving no shock treatment. Furthermore, many failed 
to escape shock even once (Overmier & Seligman, 1967). 
Seligman and Maier's (1967) study introduced the yoked, triadic 
design, which became the standard for most animal and some human 
helplessness research. This design consists of a control group which 
receives no treatment with either controllable or uncontrollable 
stimuli, a group treated with controllable outcomes, and a "yoked 
control" group, which receives identical exposure to the outcomes 
as the "controllable" group, but does not have any means of controlling 
them. Therefore, only the dimension of controllability distinguishes 
the latter two groups. Seligman and Maier found that dogs treated 
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in the apparatus described earlier, but which could terminate shock 
by pressing on the head panels did not show later learning deficits. 
Animals which received yoked, inescapable shock did show subsequent 
helpless behavior. Therefore, the notion that controllability is the 
critical factor in producing interference in the shuttlebox gained 
credence in this study. 
In addition to longer shuttlebox response latencies (elapsed 
teme between CS onset and avoidance/escape response), the helpless 
animals showed grossly impaired ability to learn the escape response 
at all. Successful escape or avoidance by a helpless dog character­
istically would not be followed by increased barrier jumping following 
CS onset. Rather, on subsequent trials these dogs would revert to 
passive acceptance of shock. This phenomenon led the authors to 
propose the associative or cognitive deficit in helplessness. They 
reasoned that an expectation of no control leaves animals without 
motivation to respond, and, further, inhibits the formation of a new 
expectancy, or association between barrier-jumping and shock 
termination. 
A good deal of research has been done to test the idea that 
the observable learning deficits in helplessness are mediated 
cognitively, as proposed by the theory, and to rule out other 
explanations (e.g., Maier, 1970; Maier & Testa, 1975; Seligman, 
Maier & Geer, 1968). This literature is comprehensively reviewed by 
Maier and Seligman (1976). An analysis of the question of cognitive 
mediation is outside the scope of this paper. However, cognitive 
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mediation is termed the cornerstone of helplessness theory 
(Maier & Seligman, 1976), so the point bears emphasizing. Of 
course, the proposed expectancy of noncontingency cannot be directly 
measured. Its existence is inferred from the observation that in 
helpless animals, successful escape or avoidance does not reliably 
predict future successful responding. It is this author's conclusion 
that although the utility of theorizing about animal cognitions is 
questionable, research to date is consistent with the cognitive 
mediation theory. Also, helplessness researchers have done an 
admirable job of disconfirming competing hypotheses (see Maier 
& Seligman, 1976). 
Human studies. In the earliest reported studies with humans, 
Fosco and Geer (1971) and Thornton and Jacobs (1971) attempted to 
demonstrate helplessness following inescapable electric shock. Close 
inspection reveals flaws which render these studies unimpressive, 
however. Fosco and Geer completely confounded uncontrollability 
with amount of exposure to shock. In Thornton and Jacob's study, 
subjects who could control shock on a training task performed better 
than subjects who could not, but those who had no control performed 
no worse than controls. Therefore, there was no helplessness effect. 
Hiroto (1974) provided stronger evidence that helplessness effects 
could be produced in humans, using a design modeled on Seligman's 
animal studies. The treatment in Hiroto's study was inescapable 
loud noise delivered through headphones. Subjects were given a 
button-pushing task, and told that there was something they could do 
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to turn off the loud noise. For one group of subjects this was true, 
but for another group the noise was independent of their responding. 
The posttest was a human analog of the shuttlebox. Subjects slid a 
knob along a channel in the top of a box, and could avoid or escape 
noise by moving the knob to alternating ends of the channel on 
each trial. Results were as predicted on four of the five dependent 
measures. Similar to results with animals, the inescapable noise 
subjects (F) had both longer response latencies and more failures to 
escape noise on the posttest than either escapable noise subjects (E) 
or controls (C). Additionally, they required more trials to reach 
both escape and avoidance criteria (defined as three consecutive 
escapes, or avoidances, respectively) than E or C groups. However, 
Wortman and Brehm (1975) pointed out that Hiroto's Ë" and E groups 
were not yoked, and that controllability therefore was confounded 
with exposure to noise. Furthermore, the IE group received consider­
ably more noise than the E group. 
This problem was rectified by Hiroto and Seligman (1975) who, 
using yoked groups (therefore a true triadic design) demonstrated 
performance deficits following uncontrollable noise. These 
researchers also induced helplessness by exposing subjects to a 
series of insolvable cognitive discrimination problems, which they 
argued are "formally analogous" to inescapable aversive stimulation, 
since in both, the probability of reinforcement is independent of 
responding. Hiroto and Seligman also showed that helplessness 
effects are not necessarily specific to situations similar to the 
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helplessness training situation. They used two types of posttests, 
the motor, manipulandum task used by Hiroto (1974), and a series of 
20 solvable anagrams. All of the anagrams had the same letter 
sequence so that once subjects "caught on" to the solution of one, 
they held the solution to all of them, and it remained only for 
them to recognize this fact. Solution of the anagram task, thus, 
was analogous to solution of the shuttlebox task. Helplessness 
effects were noted on both motor and cognitive posttests following 
both instrumental and cognitive treatments. 
Many other investigators have produced helplessness effects in 
humans. Subjects treated with inescapable noise have shown deficits 
on shuttlebox tasks (Krantz, Glass, & Snyder, 1974) and anagram 
tasks (Gatchel, Paulus, & Maples, 1975; Gatchel & Proctor, 1976). 
Glass and Singer (1972, pp. 109-120) reported impaired performance 
on cognitive tasks following uncontrollable electric shock, but no 
deficits following an equal number of controllable shocks. Rodin 
(1976), Benson and Kennelly (1976), and Cohen, Rothbart, and Phillips 
(1976) used a cognitive induction (insolvable problems) and reported 
interference on performance of cognitive tasks, as did Miller and 
Seligman (1975), Klein, Pencil-Morse, and Seligman (1976), Teasdale 
(1978), and Price, Tryon and Raps (1978). Klein and Seligman (1976) 
reported shuttlebox learning deficits following exposure to ines­
capable noise which were reversed by a "therapy" consisting of 
solvable problems. The "cure" was explained in terms of a reversal 
of the expectancy of noncontrol via the therapy. 
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Taken together, these studies convincingly demonstrate that 
performance deficits can be produced in humans by exposure to 
instrumental or cognitive insolvable problems. Most studies do not 
specify whether the dependent measures tap motivational deficits 
or cognitive deficits. It appears to this author that it is 
impossible to distinguish the two types. The cognitive deficit, 
occasionally operationally defined as failure to find the solution 
to a motor or cognitive task (e.g.. Miller & Seligman, 1975), could 
reflect either low motivation or a cognitive inhibition of perform­
ance. Furthermore, any of a number of cognitive processes could 
depress performance. 
Several authors have argued that although performance deficits 
are regularly produced in human helplessness studies, the studies 
are not convincing that these deficits result from the expectancy 
of noncontingency. In a critical review, Costallo (1978) argued 
that very little evidence exists which supports the learned helpless­
ness interpretation of Seligman's data. Competing explanations 
abound, some with experimental support. For example, Lavelle, 
Metal sky, and Coyne (1979) argued that an attentional factor, 
specifically the self-preoccupation manifested by high test-anxious 
persons can explain helplessness effects.- In their study, only 
high test-anxious persons developed helplessness deficits. Other 
competing hypotheses include "learned skepticism," which could occur 
when similar treatment and posttest settings, tasks, or experi­
menters are used, in which case the generalization of the expectancy 
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of noncontrol to the posttest is appropriate (Wortman & Brehm, 1975); 
loss or protecting of self-esteem (Blaney, 1977; Frankel & Snyder, 
1978; Sacco & Hokanson, 1978); failure generalization (Hanusa & 
Schultz, 1977); and either simple extinction or disturbing emotion 
(Costello, 1978). At the present time there is insubstantial 
evidence to conclude that performance deficits in humans flow 
straightforwardly from an expectancy of noncontingency. 
Attributions and performance deficits in human helplessness 
Only a few studies of the role of attributions on helplessness 
have been reported. Of these, locus of control is the primary 
attributional dimension which has been manipulated. According to 
helplessness theory, this manipulation should affect subjects' 
self esteem, and possibly, intensity of affect, but not their 
performance on the posttest. The first study of this type was 
conducted by Klein, Pencil-Morse, and Seligman (1976). In 
addition to the traditional solvable-problem, insolvable-problem, 
and no-problem control groups, they included two insolvable-problem 
groups for whom attributions about the problems were manipulated. 
Both groups were exposed to the uncontrollable outcomes, but one 
group was shown false norms indicating that nearly everyone succeeded 
in solving such problems in an earlier experiment. The other group 
saw norms indicating that almost none of their peers could solve 
such problems. The intent was to provide the first group with an 
internal attribution for failure and to provide the second group with 
an external attribution. In addition, a group of depressed subjects 
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was included in each experimental treatment. 
Consistent with the revised theory (although this study preceded 
that theory), the attribution manipulation had no effect on non-
depressed subjects made helpless in the lab. The helplessness 
induction resulted in impaired anagram performance, but it impaired 
all groups (internal, external, and no-attribution) equally. 
Attributions did, on the other hand, remarkably affect the perfor­
mance of depressed subjects. Supplying depressed persons with an 
external attribution significantly reduced their anagram deficits 
relative to no-attribution and internal-attribution depressed 
groups. It is unclear why attributions affected the anagram 
performance of depressed persons, but not of helpless subjects. 
Attributions of helpless subjects were manipulated in three 
additional studies. Results were inconsistent with each other 
and with helplessness theory. Tennen and Eller (1977) manipulated 
both attributions for failure and amount of exposure to failure. 
They found no performance deficits following 48 unsuccessful trials. 
Under "double helplessness" conditions (96 trials) the ability-
attribution group showed posttest deficits, but the task difficulty-
attribution group showed facilitated posttest performance as 
compared with controls. That is, subjects given insolvable problems 
who were led to believe their failure was due to difficulty of the 
problem performed better on the posttest than subjects given no 
treatment. The authors suggested that people redouble their efforts 
following situation-specific failures. 
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In two other studies, however, subjects supplied with ability 
attributions (incompetence) for their treatment failures performed 
better than all other groups. These authors argue that small 
amounts of failure attributed to ability motivate subjects to 
perform better in order to reestablish their control, or competence 
(Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, & Hibscher, 1976; Hanusa & Schultz, 
1977). Hanusa and Schultz also included an effort-attribution group, 
whose performance was unaffected by the treatment. 
A problem for helplessness theory is that (with the exception 
of Tennen and Eller's double-helplessness, ability-attribution group) 
no subjects given unsolvable problems in these three studies showed 
performance deficits. This may be due to the fact that the posttest 
was presented to subjects as a separate experiment from the treat­
ment. It immediately followed the treatment in each case, but 
took place in a different room, and involved a different task 
and different experimenter. Expectancies of noncontrol may not have 
generalized to the new situation. 
It is perhaps more problematic for the theory that in several 
cases attributions about helplessness facilitated the performance of 
depressed persons, or those given helplessness treatments. This, of 
course, is completely inconsistent with the theory. It appears, as 
Wortman and Dintzer (1978) have argued, that attributions are not 
as straightforwardly linked with behavior as the helplessness model 
suggests. Amount of helplessness training and other variables, 
such as certainty of uncontrollability, probably mediate the effects 
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of attributions on performance. 
Other challenges concerning the role of attributions in 
Abramson's et al. (1978) model have been made. Whether helpless 
subjects make attributions at all has been questioned. Hanusa and 
Schultz (1977) were unable to elicit any spontaneous reports of 
attributions about helplessness from their subjects. Also, Wortman 
and Dintzer (1978) charged that unless the model specifies how and 
when the attributions characteristic of depression are made, it 
becomes circular as it applies to depression. This author agrees. 
Abramson et al. (1978) asserted that the evidence to date 
provides "some support" for their conception of the role of attri­
butions in helplessness (p. 63). It is this author's observation 
that the support is almost negligible. The findings to date are 
disparate, and few are explainable by the current theory. Help­
lessness theory became more complex, probably necessarily, as it 
began to be applied to human behavior. However, as Huesman (1978) 
pointed out, the incorporation of attributions appears to have 
increased the theory's explanatory and predictive power at the 
price of precision and falsifiability. At the very least, much 
more work is required to clarify and substantiate the theory's 
explanations of the function of attributions in both helplessness 
and depression. 
Emotional deficits in helplessness 
Animal research. Animal studies first spurred speculation that 
helplessness involves an emotional disruption. Overmier and Seligman 
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(1967) reported helpless behavior in dogs tested 24 hours after one 
session of inescapable shock, but normal behavior in dogs not tested 
until 48, 72, or 144 hours after inescapable shock. In the estimation 
of Maier and Seligman (1976), this phenomenon "hints of a transient 
emotional disturbance" (p. 15). Additionally, Maier and Seligman 
cited several studies of stress in animals (e.g., Weiss, 1968; 
1971a; 1971b; 1971c), and the large "experimental neurosis" 
literature (e.g., Masserman, 1943) as suggesting that uncontrol- . 
lability results in significant emotional stress. 
The animal literature obviously provides only speculation about 
the existence or nature of the emotional dimension of learned 
helplessness. Overmier and Seligman's (1967) observation that 
response retardation dissipates with time, as do emotions, in no 
way constitutes evidence that emotions are associated with that 
response retardation. Furthermore, if the dissipation of helpless­
ness indicates "transient emotional disturbance," this mitigates 
against the basic claim that the central mechanism in helplessness 
is a cognitive one. 
Except for Overmier and Seligman (1967), none of the studies 
cited by Maier and Seligman (1976) measured disruption of learning 
(i.e., the motivational/cognitive deficit of helplessness). For that 
reason, it is impossible to state the relationship between those 
results and helplessness. Finally, controllability was not 
explicitly manipulated in the experimental neurosis studies. 
Therefore, controllability might be a factor in those animals' 
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emotional distress, but so might any number of other uncontrolled 
factors. Strong evidence that helplessness involves an affective 
component, and, perhaps more pertinent to the present discussion, 
an affective component similar to the affect of depression, clearly 
awaited human studies. 
Human research. As was noted earlier, Seligman (1975) incor­
porated emotionality into helplessness theory, proposing that the 
initial emotional state in helplessness is fear, which is replaced 
by depression as the uncontrollability of the situation is realized. 
Interestingly, he cited performance facilitation noted by Roth 
and Bootzin (1974) in "helpless" subjects as supporting this idea. 
Roth and Bootzin found that college students initiated more adaptive, 
controlling responses after exposure to unsdlvable problems. They 
suggested that a curvilinear relationship exists between uncontrol­
lable outcomes and controlling behaviors. The initial reaction to 
uncontrollable experiences may be increased effort to gain control 
which, if unsuccessful, is followed by response retardation. Roth 
and Kubal (1975) supported this notion. They found facilitation 
following one uncontrollable task, but deficits following three such 
tasks. This sequence fits logically with Seligman's argument for 
a fear—depression emotional progression, however it obviously says 
nothing directly about emotion in helplessness. In that Abramson 
et al. (1978) did not mention a fear--de'pression sequence, however, 
it appears that this thinking is irrelevant to current theory. 
In studies which have measured emotion directly, generally a 
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few 1-item measures have been administered immediately before or 
after the posttest. Two methodological problems are present in 
these studies. First is the questionable reliability of 1-item 
measures. Secondly, only a few arbitrarily-chosen dimensions of 
emotion are measured in each study. Since the range of possible 
emotions is not tapped, it is impossible from these findings 
characterize the emotional quality of helplessness. However, the 
cumulative findings suggest that helplessness produces a complex 
array of emotional responses, not simply "depressed affect." 
Therefore, findings to date appear not strongly supportive of 
the theory. 
Consistent with Hiroto and Seligman's (1975) helpless group, 
who reported greater frustration than other groups, Cohen's et al. 
(1976) helpless group quit earlier on a frustration tolerance task 
than solvable-problem counterparts. Krantz's et al. (1974) 
helpless group, when in a high stress condition, rated themselves 
more incompetent, passive, and hostile than nonhelpless groups. 
Teasdale (1978) reported increased despondency, and Willis and Blaney 
(1978) found increased depression, and lowered optimism and confi­
dence among helpless subjects. Roth and Bootzin (1974) reported 
more stress and frustration, and Glass and Singer (1972) reported 
more helpless, incompetent, and weak feelings among subjects given 
insolvable problems. Helplessness in Roth and Kubal's (1975) 
study was associated with feelings of helplessness, incompetence, 
stress, frustration, depression, anger, fatigue, displeasure about 
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performance, and unfairness. Lave!le. Metal sky, and Coyne (1980) 
found greater frustration, and lesser feelings of happiness, 
competence, strength, and success among inescapable-noise subjects. 
In two studies, Klein and Seligman (1976) monitored sadness, 
nervousness, and anger on 1-item 11-point scales before the experi­
ment, after the noise treatment, and before and after solvable-problem 
"therapy." No mood shifts were found for any group, with the single 
exception of a decrease in sadness following solvable-problem 
therapy. The authors hypothesized that the measures may have been 
insensitive to pick up on emotional changes. 
In three studies, emotional changes during the experiment were 
assessed using a more sophisticated instrument, the Multiple 
Affect Adjective Check List (Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel, and Valerius, 
1964). Gatchel et al. (1975) administered the MAACL before the 
experiment, after helplessness training, and following anagram 
trials. Helpless subjects scored higher than the controllable-
outcome group on all three subscales—hostility, anxiety, and 
depression—following training, but the groups did not differ at 
the other two assessment points. Helpless subjects also reported 
feeling more "helpless." Likewise, Miller and Seligman (1975) 
found increased depression, anxiety, and hostility among nonde-
pressed subjects given inescapable noise. Depressed subjects 
reported increased anxiety and hostility after the treatment. 
Cole and Coyne (1977) found an increase in depression and hostility 
in all subjects, regardless of type of treatment problems they 
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received. Like the studies cited above, results of these three 
suggest that negative but complex emotional reactions accompany 
helplessness. 
Attribution and affect in helplessness 
One principal question of the present thesis concerns the role 
of attributions on affect in helplessness. In three studies attri­
butions about helplessness were manipulated, and effects on affect 
as well as performance were measured. Unfortunately, the results 
yield little information about these«factors in helplessness. In 
two studies (as reviewed earlier), the predicted performance deficits 
were not produced among persons given the helplessness treatment. In 
the third study, affect data went unreported. 
As has been noted,-Wortman et al. (1976) manipulated subjects' 
perceptions along the internal-external dimension. They hypothe­
sized that personal attributions about failure would lead to greater 
stress in helplessness. Their results support this prediction. 
Individuals who attributed failure to incompetence experienced 
greater stress than those who attributed it to task difficulty, 
or those who received a solvable-problem treatment. The latter two 
groups did not differ from each other in terms of stress. More 
specifically, the incompetence-attribution group reported feeling 
greater helplessness, upset, frustration, anger, and arousal on 7-
point semantic differential-type scales. In contrast, the task 
difficulty group experienced no greater stress than controls. 
Recall, however, that performance deficits were not induced in either 
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the internal- or external-attribution group. The persons who made 
ability attributions and reported high stress performed better on 
the posttest than other groups. Therefore, the results cannot be 
interpreted in light of helplessness theory. Wortman et al. argue, 
however, that stress in helplessness-inducing situations is a function 
of attributions about one's performance, not lack of control per se. 
Tennen and Eller (1977) also induced ability or task difficulty 
attributions for failures. They measured affect on three 1-item, 
7-point sliding scales which addressed anger, nervousness, and 
sadness before and after the helplessness treatment. All subjects' 
nervousness decreased after the treatment. Sadness decreased for 
those given solvable problems, and one group given insolvable 
problems reported a large increase in anger. That particular group, 
however, (the group which received only one 48-trial problem) showed 
no performance deficits, so these results, again, say nothing about 
affect in helplessness. 
Finally, Klein, Fencil-Morse, and Seligman (1976) measured 
sadness, nervousness, and anger before and after the treatment 
phase on 11-point sliding scales. They reported that sadness 
decreased following solvable problems, and anger increased after 
insolvable problems, "but these scales are at best crude indicators 
of mood, so the data will not be reported" (p. 512). 
One consistent thread appears to exist among this data: expe­
rience with solvable problems makes people feel less sad. Over all 
of the studies which have measured affect, the effects of exposure 
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to uncontrollable aversive outcomes are less clearcut, and difficult 
to distill to a few dimensions. In some cases, somewhat consistent 
with Seligman's (1975) original theory of emotion in helplessness, 
it appears that uncontrollable situations induce emotional activa­
tion (stress, anger, arousal) which may facilitate performance. In 
other cases, where response deficits are produced, frustration, 
hostility, depression, and anxiety are rather consistently reported. 
Abramson's et al. (1978) model predicts a unidimensional emotional 
response to helplessness treatment: dysphoria or depressed affect. 
In contrast, findings to date have the flavor of a general, 
undifferentiated stress reaction. Helplessness appears not to 
be characterized by any one negative emotional dimension to the 
exclusion of others. 
Affect in depression 
In contrast to a rather generalized stress reaction, current 
definitions of actual depressive mood are quite specific. The 
DSM III (Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, 1980) defines 
mood as "a prolonged emotion that colors the whole psychic life" 
(p, 205), The mood of depression is described as: 
dysphoric mood . . . characterized by symptoms such as depressed, 
sad, blue, hopeless, low, down in the dumps, irritable. The 
mood disturbance must be prominent and relatively persistent 
. . . and does not include momentary shifts from one dysphoric 
mood to another dysphoric mood, e.g., anxiety to depression to 
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anger, such as are seen in states of acute psychotic 
turmoil. (p. 213) [underlining added] 
Thus, depressed persons are not expected to show anxiety or anger 
proportionate to their depressed mood. 
Similarly, Aaron Beck (1967) noted that anger is relatively 
absent in depressed persons, as is anxiety, when depression is 
defined by his instrument, the Beck Depression Inventory. Beck 
described the affect characteristic of depression as dejected mood, 
which encompasses the descriptors miserable, hopeless, blue, sad, 
lonely, unhappy, downgraded, humiliated, ashamed, worried, useless, 
and guilty (p. 17). In contrast with helplessness theorists. Beck's 
thesis is that the affect of depression follows from the manner in 
which people interpret important negative events which occur in 
thier lives. One pervasive tendency of depressives, he asserts, is 
to perceive negative events as attributable to defects in themselves. 
Self-depreciating interpretations produce sad affect. Thus, attri­
butions determine affect according to Beck's theory (Beck, 1967; 
1976). 
Affect and Attribution in the Normal Personality 
Recent work by Weiner and his colleagues (Weiner, Russell, & 
Lerman, 1978) provides evidence that causal attributions mediate 
affect in normal persons following their success or failure on a 
task. Their methodology allows an assessment of the qualitative 
affective differences which follow from various attributions, and 
is modeled in the present study. Before the study is described. 
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some background for their work is presented. 
Working in the area of achievement motivation, Weiner and 
colleagues (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971) 
theorized that four major causal elements are involved whenever 
people interpret or predict an achievement-related outcome. These 
elements are effort, ability, task difficulty, and luck. Any one 
can be deemed the primary causal element, but this decision is made 
after an active assessment of the role of all four on the outcome. 
That is, the individuals weigh their ability level against the 
difficulty of the task, consider effort expended, and the role of 
luck, then arrive at a decision regarding the importance of each 
factor in the outcome. Causality, and responsibility for the outcome, 
then, are attributed differentially to the causal elements. 
Weiner et al. (1971) proposed that attributions influence 
both the expectancy that an outcome will occur again and the affect 
that is aroused in regard to a particular outcome (or, its reward 
value). Expectancy and goal attractiveness are thought to jointly 
determine one's level of motivation to achieve an outcome; therefore, 
attributions play a potentially very important role in achievement-
related behavior. 
Weiner and colleagues categorized the four causal elements along 
the dimensions of stable-unstable, intentionality, and internal-
external. With regard to a given task, ability and task difficulty 
are factors not presumed to change (stable), while effort and luck 
fluctuate (unstable). Weiner et al. argued in 1971 that expec­
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tancies about the occurrence of an outcome (for example, a good 
grade) are formed primarily as a function of the stability of the 
peceived cause. When an outcome is attributed to stable elements 
(e.g., ability), one outcome (a good grade) predicts another similar 
one. When attributions are to unstable elements (e.g., luck), 
expectancies for future outcomes are not based on previous outcomes. 
This position was adopted by Abramson et al. in 1978 as applied 
to the stability of helplessness. 
Second, some attributed causes clearly involve intention (e.g., 
effort), whereas others are unintentional (e.g., ability). This 
dimension has not been researched very much, although it clearly is 
involved in judgements of moral culpability (Weiner et al., 1978). 
Third, some attributions (e.g., ability and effort) refer to 
qualities of the person (are internal), and some (e.g., task 
difficulty and luck) refer to qualities in the environment (are 
external). For a time, the internal-external dimension was thought 
to mediate affect in a simple and straightforward way. Specifically, 
affect was thought to increase as outcomes were attributed to 
internal qualities. Thus, for example, pride in accomplishments and 
shame for failures would increase to the degree that one assumes 
internal causality and responsibility (Weiner, 1974). 
More recent work has shown that the relationship between affect 
and attribution is more complex than this. Elig and Frieze (1975) 
and Frieze (1976) explored subjectively perceived causes of 
successes and failures by eliciting them in a free response format. 
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They found that many such causes exist. Weiner et al. (1978) 
suggested that some internal attributions such as effort may maximize 
certain emotions such as shame, but external attributions (e.g., 
teacher personality) may maximize other emotions such as anger. 
Their research was the first attempt to catalog the quality of 
emotional responses which are specific to a variety of attributed 
causes. Weiner et al. selected the 10 ascriptions for success and 
the 11 ascriptions for failure which encompasses the majority of 
those causes described by Elig and Frieze and Frieze. Subjects in 
their study were presented with a short vignette describing a success 
or failure along with the supposed cause. Subjects were then asked 
to describe the feelings of the stimulus person in the story. 
The dependent measure was a list of either 85 positive affects 
(following success stories) or 150 negative affects (following 
failure stories). Each affect was responded to on a rating scale 
anchored at the poles by "not at all" and "extremely." 
Results showed that within both success and failure conditions, 
there was a large overlap in the affects which were endorsed for 
the various attributed causes. For example, "pleased," and "happy" 
were among the 10 most highly rated affects for all 10 of the 
success causes. Regardless of perceived cause, success was 
associated with pleasure. Similarly, "uncheerful" and "displeasure" 
were frequently cited for the failure outcome regardless of the 
reason for the failure. Beyond the similarities, however, the 
various causes were related to very specific affects. "Discriminating 
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affects" were isolated for each cause by performing ^ tests on the 
mean intensity rating of an affect for one attributed cause as 
compared to its rating for all other attributed causes combined. The 
discriminating affects are summarized in Table 1, which is taken 
from Weiner et al. (1978). The principal conclusion of the study, 
illustrated in the table, is that different attributions produce 
distinct emotional reactions. 
While guilt and shame were the highest given effort attributions, 
despair was given its lowest ratings when effort was the cause of 
the failure, apparently reflecting the volitional element which 
effort implies. Aggression was most strongly tied to attributions 
of others' personal characteristics or motivation, while assigning 
responsibility to one's own personality resulted in resignation and 
apathy. In discussing their results Weiner et al. suggested that 
the affect in depression (hopeless, helpless, depressed, resigned, 
aimless) perhaps follows from a proclivity toward the internal, 
stable attributions of ability, stable effort, personality factors, 
and intrinsic motivation. The authors also suggested that the affect 
which accompanies learned helplessness would vary as a function of 
attributions made about that helplessness. This latter issue is one 
of those investigated in the present study. 
Learned helplessness is induced in humans by exposing them to 
noise which they are unable to turn off with the instruments 
available to them, or to discrimination problems for which there 
is no correct answer (i.e., uncontrollable bad outcomes). Abramson 
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Table 1 
Discriminating Affects for Various Causal Attributions for Failure 
Ability t X Personality t X 
i ncompetent 10.1 (7.5) resigned 9.6 (6.4) 
inadequate 8.0 (7.5) apathetic 7.6 (5.5) 
aimless 7.6 (6.1) i ncompetent 4.8 (6.3) 
panic 7.2 (7.1) aimless 4.4 (5.4) 
humble 6.8 (5.8) solemn 2.1 (5.3) 
Unstable effort Other's effort 
ashamed 9.2 (7.8) ferocious 9.2 (5.9) 
scared 8.8 (7.5) revengeful 9.0 (6.0) 
sorry 8.4 (8.6) aggressive 8.6 (7.0) 
panic 8.0 (7.4) furious 8.6 (7.2) 
guilty 7.2 (7.9) bi tter 6.4 (7.9) 
Stable effort Other's motivation and personality 
humble 9.6 (6.4) revengeful 10.0 (6.3) 
guilty 7.4 (7.0) surprised 8.4 (6.0) 
troubled 5.7 (8.3) VICIOUS 7.6 (5.9) 
hopeless 5.6 (6.9) wonderment 6.1 (5.1) 
ashamed 4.0 (6.4) fuming 6.8 (6.9) 
Task Difficulty lb X Luck ;t X 
stunned 8.0 (7.1) astonished 12.6 (7.1) 
unexcited 7.7 (5.9) overwhelmed 11.8 (6.6) 
dumbfounded 6.9 (6.2) surprised 10.8 (6.6) 
thoughtful 6.8 (6.3) stunned 10.0 (7.6) 
displeasure 6.5 (8.7) horrified 9.3 (7.0) 
Mood Intrinsic motivation 
disgust 6.7 (8.3) sad 4.7 (7.9) 
horrified 6.3 (6.3) resigned 3.9 (5.3) 
bewildered 6.0 (6.0) helpi ess 3.4 (6.8) 
frenzied 5.8 (6.0) apathetic 3.2 (4.4) 
tormented 5.0 (6.8) bl ue 3.2 (7.6) 
Fatigue-illness 
offended 7.0 (6.1) 
unnerved 6.5 (7.0) 
sorry 6.3 (8.1) 
shaken 6.3 (7.9) 
sullen 5.9 (8.0) 
Note. From Weiner. et al. (1978). 
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et al. (1978) assert that "failure is a subset of uncontrollability 
involving bad outcomes" (p. 54). Thus, failure implies uncontrol-
lability (though not vice versa), and Weiner's et al. (1978) 
findings on attribution and affect would seem to apply to the case 
of helplessness. 
It will be recalled that Abramson et al. (1978) proposed that 
depression-prone individuals tend to make internal, stable, and 
global attributions for failure. This style would lead to rela­
tively chronic and stable personal helplessness, which entails 
lowered self-esteem, according to the helplessness model. Yet the 
emotion accompanying this state is expected to be the same as that in 
helplessness which involves any or all other kinds of causal 
attributions, provided the uncontrollable outcome is an important one. 
The important question which this study addressed is the source 
of the emotion in helplessness (and depression, if one momentarily 
accepts the helplessness model)--in the experience of noncontrol 
over important events (as proposed by Seligman and colleagues), or 
in the interpretation (attribution) of that lack of control. 
Introduction to the Present Study 
The purposes of the present study, broadly, were two: (a) to 
assess the quality of the emotion which accompanies helplessness, and 
(b) to assess the relationship between various causal attributions 
for helplessness and the affect associated with them. In addition, 
the affect reported by a group of untreated depressives was compared 
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with affect reported by the "helpless" subjects to see if the 
moods of the two states are indeed parallel, as the helplessness 
model predicts. The helplessness treatment was a series of standard 
insolvable concept-formation, or discrimination problems (e.g., 
Hiroto and Seligman, 1975). Five groups were treated with insolvable 
problems. For one of these groups, no attribution about the cause 
of failing the problems was supplied. Other groups were given 
information designed to lead them to attribute their failures to 
ability, effort, task difficulty, or to having been tricked by 
the experimenter. A no-treatment control group did not attempt any 
problems. All groups responded to a modified version of Weiner's 
et al. (1978) list of negative affects, and the nondepressed groups 
completed an anagram-solving task. Those groups were compared on 
anagram performance and reported affect. Discriminating affects, 
which characterized each group as contrasted with all other groups, 
were isolated by a procedure similar to Weiner's et al. (1978). 
The affect of the untreated depressed sample was compared with that 
of the no-attribution helpless group. The following hypotheses were 
advanced. 
Performance deficits 
1. It was predicted that subjects treated with insolvable 
problems but not supplied with any attribution for their failures 
would show characteristic learning deficits on the anagram post-
test, relative to controls. This is the helplessness effect reported 
by numerous researchers (e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, 1975) reviewed 
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earlier. In view of conflicting results of earlier research 
involving attribution manipulation, whether the other attribution 
groups would show anagram learning deficits was treated as an 
empirical question. 
Affect 
2. Based on research reviewed previously (e.g., Miller & 
Seligman, 1975; Lave!le, Metalsky, & Coyne, 1979), the no-attribution 
group was expected to report affect indicative of a generalized 
stressful reaction, including greater frustration, anxiety, 
hostility, and depression than controls. Whether any discriminating 
affects would emerge for this group was treated as an empirical 
question, since no evidence exists which bears on this point. 
Generally, however, fewer discriminating affects were expected 
to emerge for this group than for the various groups for which 
attributions were supplied. 
3. Hypothesis 3 was based on the findings of Weiner et al. 
(1978), findings which were expected to generalize to the case of 
learned helplessness. Across subjects treated with insolvable 
problems, all were expected to report a number of common, or 
nondiscriminating affects. For example, "displeasure" and "upset" 
might be expected to receive similar intensity ratings by the various 
groups regardless of attribution about failure. However, discrim­
inating affects were expected to emerge among the helpless groups 
which received different attributional information. The general 
flavor of the discriminating affects was expected to be as follows: 
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a. Feelings of incompetence and inadequacy would characterize 
the ability-attribution group. 
b. The experimenter-trickery group would report hostility. 
c. The effort-attribution group would be discriminably 
associated with guilt and shame. 
d. The task difficulty group would exhibit a lack of 
excitement or involvement. 
4. As compared with the no-attribution group, the depressed 
group was expected to reflect the tone of depression described by 
Beck (1967) and the DSM III (Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, 
1980), including greater sadness, guilt, and hopelessness. 
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METHOD . 
The Present Investigation 
Subjects 
A total of 132 students at the University of Idaho agreed to 
serve as subjects in this study. Nondepressed subjects were 84 
introductory psychology students, who received course credit for 
their participation. These persons were assigned randomly to exper­
imental conditions, with the restrictions that equal numbers of males 
and females were assigned to each condition, and to each experimenter 
(one male and one female). 
Data were discarded for 10 nondepressed subjects, who were 
replaced by others in the subject pool. Of the 10, five voiced sus­
picion that they were deceived on the discrimination task, three of 
these in the ability condition, and one each in the task difficulty 
and effort conditions. In addition, one subject in the effort condi­
tion thought he was being given insolvable anagrams and became too 
angry to go on. Another cited a dyslexic-like problem for her in­
ability to solve the anagrams, and opted not to continue. Another 
person was replaced when we learned that English was not his native 
language, another when the experimenter ran out of time, and the last 
when the experimenter broke into fits of laughter upon hearing (for 
the fifteenth time), the taped bogus "ability attribution" instructions. 
The depressed sample consisted of 38 persons drawn from two 
sources, the psychology department subject pool, and clients of the 
Student Counseling Center at the University of Idaho. A score of 9 
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or higher on the Beek Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967) was used to 
categorize persons as "depressed." This is the score employed by 
Seligman and colleagues in numerous studies as that which operation­
ally defines depression (Miller & Seligman, 1973; 1975; 1976; Miller, 
Seligman, & Kurlander, 1975; Klein & Seligman, 1976; Klein, Fencil-
Morse, & Seligman, 1976). 
Experimenters 
All subjects drawn from the psychology department were tested 
by one of two experimenters. One was a male undergraduate psychology 
student, age 32, who conducted the experiment as part of an independent 
study under the direction of the author at the University of Idaho. 
The author, of the same age, served as the second experimenter. 
Subjects drawn from the Counseling Center were tested by the Center 
psychometrist, a male, age,32. 
Ma ten' al s 
Beck Depression Inventory. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
(see Appendix A) was used to classify subjects into depressed and 
nondepressed groups. The BDI consists of a series of 21 symptoms, 
which subjects rate according to the severity with which they are 
experiencing those symptoms. The inventory yields a single score by 
summation of item scores. The scale appears to have adequate 
reliability and validity. Beck (1967) reports a split-half 
reliability of .86 and a Spearman-Brown coefficient of .93. BDI 
scores correlated between .61 and .73 with psychiatrists' ratings of 
depth of depression in four separate studies (Beck, 1967). 
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Correlations of .75 with the MMPI D-Scale and of .75 and .82 with the 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, an interview-based diagnostic 
depression scale (Hamilton, 1960), have been reported (Schwab, Bialow, 
Martin, & Clemmons, 1965; Williams, Barlow, & Agras, 1972). Changes 
in scores on the BDI have been shown to be predictive of changes in 
depression ratings by psychiatrists, and the BDI is more effective in 
distinguishing depression from anxiety than other self-report 
measures (Beck, 1967). Finally, Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978) 
reported a correlation of .77 between BDI scores and a psychiatrist's 
rating of depth of depression in college students, who ranged between 
nondepressed and severely depressed, according to the ratings. 
On a theoretical level, it may seem inappropriate to use Beck's 
depression scale as the criterion against which Seligman's theory is 
evaluated, in that Beck's theory is in many ways a competing one with 
Seligman's. However, since Beck's scale has been the "external 
criterion" for depression in all of Seligman's investigations relating 
helplessness and depression, the phenomenon measured by the BDI is 
clearly the phenomenon to which Seligman was applying his model. 
Discrimination problems. Insolvable discrimination problems 
used in the helplessness training (Appendix B) were patterned after 
those used by Hiroto and Seligman (1975), who drew them from Levine 
(1966; 1971). Problems consisted of a series of 10 cards, each con­
taining two stimulus patterns which varied along four dimensions: 
letter (A or T); letter size (large or small); letter color (red or 
black); and border (circle or square). The stimulus on the left side 
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of each card contained one value from each dimension (for example, a 
small red A bordered by a circle) and the stimulus on the right con­
tained the complement (a large black T bordered by a square). On 
each problem, one of the values of one dimension was supposedly 
"correct"; for example, red, or small, or circle. Solutions to the 
problems required that subjects point to the side of the card which 
they believed contained the correct value. On each trial, they 
supposedly received feedback as to the correctness of their choice. 
By this process, subjects ostensibly could eliminate choices until 
they arrived at the correct value. In fact, for all but the control 
group, feedback was random and always followed this predetermined 
schedule: C-I-I-C-C-I-I-C-C-I, I-C-I-C-C-I-C-I-C-I, I-C-I-C-I-C-C-I-
C-I, I-C-C-C-I-I-I-C-C-I. Subjects in each of the five insolvable 
problem groups were exposed to four problems with 10 trials, or 
cards, per problem. The patterns on each card were chosen randomly 
from among the 16 possible pattern combinations for two 4-dimensional 
figures. 
A practice problem of five cards containing 5-dimensional 
stimulus figures was used to assure that subjects understood the 
problem-solving process. Dimensions on these problems were letter 
(X or 0), underline texture (dashed or solid), number of dots (one or 
two), letter position (top or bottom of the card), and border color 
(red or blue). 
Affect measure. The measure of negative affect used by Weiner 
et al. (1978) was adapted for use in this study. Weiner's measure 
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consisted of a randomized list of 150 negative affects to which 
subjects responded on a 9-point rating scale anchored at the extremes 
by "not at all" and "extremely." Twenty affects, whose meaning was 
unknown to ten percent or more of Weiner's subjects were eliminated 
from the list in this study. Seven descriptors were added, which 
include terms used by Beck (1967) or the DSM III (Task Force on 
Nomenclature and Statistics, 1980) to describe depressed mood. 
Subjects were asked to indicate terms for which they did not know 
the meaning. The affect measure is presented in Appendix C. 
Anagrams. A series of 20 five-letter anagrams (Appendix D), 
drawn from Tresselt and Mayzner (1966) and those used by Teasdale 
(1978) was used in the posttest phase of the study. Anagrams were 
typed on cards, one per card, and contained in a binder. The letter 
sequence for solution of each anagram was 5-3-1-2-4; for example, 
DIUTA translates into AUDIT. All were single-solution anagrams. 
More difficult anagrams were placed at the beginning of the series to 
guard against early success .eliminating a helplessness effect. 
Before beginning the main data collection, the anagrams were 
piloted to ascertain whether they were of an appropriate difficulty 
level for the intended population. The initial anagram list (Appendix 
E) was piloted on 12 subjects, four males and eight females, who were 
not given any other treatments. Of these, only five discovered the 
solution to the anagrams over the 20 trials. One of these, an admitted 
anagram expert, reached criterion after only 5 trials. The other four, 
who (like the remainder of our sample) professed little or no prior 
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experience with anagrams, required an average of 13.5 trials to reach 
criterion. Aiming for a solvability rate of closer to 50%, four 
anagrams in the original list were replaced with easier ones, drawn 
from Tresselt and Mayzner (1966). Ten subjects, four males and six 
females, were then piloted using the revised set of anagrams. Six 
reached criterion for solution, in an average of 18.5 trials. Many 
trials were required to reach criterion, but given that slightly more 
than 50% of the subjects solved the pattern, the revised list was 
adopted for use in the study. 
Manipulation check. A short questionnaire (Appendix F). was used 
to check whether subjects' attributions for their discrimination 
problem failures were successfully manipulated. Four attribution 
items assessed the degree to which ability, effort, task difficulty, 
and experimenter manipulation were perceived to have influenced 
performance. These items were rated on a 7-point scale anchored on 
the ends by "did not determine outcome at all" and "extremely important 
determinant of outcome." The midpoint was labeled "moderately 
important determinant of outcome." 
Additional measures. On one additional questionnaire (Appendix 
6), subjects estimated the number of anagrams they had solved, and 
rated their success on that task on a 6-point scale. They were then 
instructed to consider their performance on the anagrams and attribute 
causality for their anagram performance on the same four items that 
were used to rate attributions about the discrimination problems. 
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Procedure 
Client sample. Student Counseling Center clients who were 
referred to the psychometrist for MMPI testing were asked to 
participate in a research project. Those who agreed were tested by 
the psychometrist in the Center's testing room. After reading and 
signing an informed consent statement (Appendix H), they were given 
the Beck Depression Inventory and the negative affect measure. They 
were asked to respond to each in terms of how they had felt "lately." 
Results were forwarded to their counselors for interpretation to them. 
Psychology students. Students in the psychology department 
volunteered or were recruited to participate in a study of "Feelings 
and Problem Solving." This phase of the study was conducted in a 
medium-sized room reserved for this purpose in the Student Health 
Center, which was decorated with wall hangings and potted plants. 
Students participated individually, with a single experimenter who, 
unless otherwise indicated, sat on the opposite side of a small 
table. Upon arrival, each student was met in a small waiting room by 
the experimenter, and escorted to the experiment room. Each person 
read and signed an informed consent statement (Appendix I), then 
filled out the GDI. At this point, the experimenter retired to a 
chair across the room. The completed BDIs were scored by the 
experimenter at a counter across the room from the subject, and 
persons scoring 9 or above were asked to complete the negative affect 
measure while the experimenter sat across the room. The meaning of 
these persons' BDI scores was discussed with them, they were given 
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information about counseling and credit for their participation, and 
dismissed. Persons scoring 8 or below on the BDI proceeded with the 
discrimination problems. 
Discrimination problems. In the second phase of the experiment, 
the nondepressed students were presented with the Levi ne discrimina­
tion problems. They were informed: 
In order that everyone who does this experiment hears 
exactly the same instructions, we have tape recorded 
some of them, and others I will be reading to you. 
For now, please pay attention to the tape recorder. 
I'll be stopping the recorder later to see if you have 
questions, but for now, please listen carefully. 
All subjects heard the following tape recorded instructions, 
adapted from Hiroto and Seligman (.1975): 
In this experiment you will be looking at cards contained 
in this notebook. The cards are all something like this 
one. Each will have two stimulus patterns on it. The 
stimulus patterns on this card, and on the other sample 
cards which follow, are composed of five different 
dimensions. These dimensions are border, letter, 
underlining, dots, and pattern position. Each dimension 
has two values associated with it: the border color is 
red or blue, the letter is an X or an 0, the underlining 
is either dashed or solid, there are 1 or 2 dots, and 
the pattern position is either high or low. Each 
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stimulus pattern on a card contains one value from each 
of the five dimensions. 
Instructions to control subjects continued as follows: 
You will be shown a number of cards of this type by the 
experimenter. As you see them, please point to the side 
of the card which seems to you to be the most interesting. 
Please pay attention to your own reactions, and point 
to the stimulus pattern which is automatically more 
pleasing, or interesting to you. 
Let's go through the sample set of cards. Begin now 
by pointing to the most appealing pattern on this card. 
Other groups heard the following instructions: 
This notebook contains five sample cards of the type you 
are looking at, and also four sets of experimental cards. 
For these sample cards, we have chosen one of the ten 
values as being correct. For example, "X" or "red" or 
"solid" may be the correct answer. On each card, 
please point to the side which you think contains the 
correct value, and the experimenter will then tell you 
if your choice was correct or incorrect. The object 
for you is to figure out what the correct answer is 
so that you can choose correctly as often as possible. 
Two procedures were used to manipulate attributions about 
performance. Differing tape recorded instructions about the cause 
success and failure for the task were given to subjects in the 
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different attribution groups. These instructions were modeled in 
part after Kukla (1972), Hanusa and Schultz (1977), and Feather and 
Simon (1971). Secondly, false norms about the performance of 
subjects' peers on the task were shown to them (see Appendices J, 
K, & L). Usefulness of norms in manipulating attributions is 
substantiated by findings by Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed 
(1976), Feather and Simon (1971), and Klein, Fencil-Morse, and 
Seligman (1976). Also, an attempt was made to impress subjects 
with the importance of the task, since Abramson, et al. (1978) 
proposed that only uncontrollability over important outcomes 
produces emotional effects. 
The tape recorded instructions to the various groups continued 
as follows: 
No-attribution group and experimenter manipulation group 
We are very much, interested in studying this type of pattern 
discrimination test. Psychologists really don't know yet 
what makes some people succeed while others fail on this 
type of test. These are important questions, however, and 
ones which we hope to help answer. Do your best. We hope 
you'll do well. 
Task difficulty attribution group 
We are very much interested in studying this type of 
pattern discrimination test, because these problems 
are very difficult to figure out. The task is a 
very difficult one. Even people who are quite 
50 
skillful, or who try hard, are frequently unsuccessful 
on these problems. Nevertheless, some people can solve 
them, and we'd like for you to attempt them. We want 
to show you, though, how college students of your age 
did on these same problems in a recent experiment. 
On a graph which the experimenter will show you 
[Appendix j], you can see that out of four problems, 
no one solved all four, 1% solved three, 2% solved,two, 
7% solved one, and 90% failed all four. Do your best. 
We hope you'll do well. 
Ability attribution group 
We are very much interested in studying this type of pattern 
discrimination test because it seems to be a very pure 
measure of creative learning ability, which college students 
generally have a lot of. We've found that success on this 
test is mainly a function of people's ability. The degree 
of effort used really doesn't seem to matter nearly as 
much as the ability factor. Some people just seem to be 
good at this test, and others are not. However, as we said, 
college students generally do well. This graph [Appendix k] 
shows that out of four problems, in a previous experiment, 
55% of students solved all of them, 30% solved three, 5% 
solved two, 7% solved one, and 3% didn't solve any. We're 
impressed with how well students are able to do this. Do 
your best. We hope you'll do well. 
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Effort attribution group 
We are very much interested in studying this type of 
pattern discrimination test. Psychologists are 
interested in this because it seems to be a very pure 
measure of effort people put into it, that is, their 
motivation to focus their attention, try hard, and do 
well. Ability doesn't seem to play a very big role 
here. Our research shows that nearly all college 
students have sufficient abi1ity to solve these problems 
successfully, it's really a matter of devoting full 
concentration to the task and being willing to not 
let up before we finish each problem. Most students 
do that pretty well. On a graph which the experimenter 
will show you [Appendix L], you can see that in a 
previous experiment, out of four problems, 45% of 
students solved all of them, 31% solved three, 13% 
solved two, 6% solved one, and 5% solved none. Do 
your best. We hope you'll do well. 
Five demonstration trials of the 5-dimensional problem were 
presented first, to clarify the task of finding the correct value. 
While control subjects merely pointed to the side which seemed most 
interesting, other groups heard the following recorded instructions: 
Let's go through the sample set of cards. Choose one side 
of the card, and point to that side. The experimenter 
will say "correct" if the side you choose contains the 
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correct value. The experimenter will say "incorrect" 
if the side you choose does not contain the correct value. 
For these groups, the experimenter gave random feedback, I-I-C-I-
I, for these five trials. The experimenter then asked if the subject 
had any questions. When there were questions, an attempt was made to 
explain the answers by restating the recorded instructions. 
Next, subjects heard the following recorded instructions: 
Control subjects 
We are now ready to proceed with the experimental cards. 
You will notice that the stimulus patterns on the experimental 
cards are different from those on the sample cards. However, 
the object is the same. Again, please pay attention to 
your reactions, and point to the side of the card which 
most appeals to you. 
All other groups 
We are now ready to proceed with the experimental cards. 
You will notice that the stimulus patterns on these cards 
are different from those on the sample cards. However, 
the object is the same. Please continue to point to 
the side of the card which you believe contains the 
correct value, and the experimenter will continue to 
tell you whether you are correct or incorrect. 
At this point, the experimenter stated, "This is problem number 1. 
There is one correct value for this problem. You will have up to 15 
seconds per card. I will tell you when you have 5 seconds left." 
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For the control group, the experimenter recorded the side of the 
card to which subjects pointed on each trial, and between trials, 
stated, "Please continue studying each stimulus pattern carefully, 
and continue pointing to the side which seems to be most interesting." 
For other groups, the experimenter pretended to consult an 
answer sheet, then delivered trial-by-trial feedback according to the 
predetermined schedule. After the 10th trial of each problem, the 
subject was asked to guess the correct value for that problem. 
Regardless of the subject's response, the experimenter stated, "No, 
that's the wrong answer." The experimenter then stated: 
We are now starting a new problem. You do not know at 
this point if we have chosen a different value as "correct" 
for this problem. I will continue to tell you if you are 
correct or incorrect in your response to each card. 
At the conclusion of the last trial, the experimenter commented 
to the various groups, as follows: 
No-attribution group 
Hmmm, you didn't solve any of them, I don't know what the 
reason would be for that. 
Task difficulty attribution group 
Hmmm, you didn't solve any of them. That's not surprising— 
these are really hard problems. 
Ability attribution group 
Hmmm, you didn't solve any of them. I guess you weren't 
able to process all that information. 
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Effort attribution group 
Hmmm, you didn't solve any of them. I guess you just 
didn't concentrate hard enough. 
Experimenter manipulation group 
Hmmm, you didn't solve any of them. Now we can tell you the 
reason for that. 
This group heard the following recorded information: 
The reason you didn't get any right answers was that, unknown 
to you, the experimenter gave you false feedback about all 
of your guesses. The experimenter actually said "correct" 
and "incorrect" in a random, scrambled-up order as you were 
doing the task. In fact, you could not have solved these 
problems. 
Manipulation check. For all groups except the controls, the 
taped instructions continued, as follows: 
We would like for you to think about your performance, now, 
on this task. What do you think influenced your performance 
the most? On the form which the experimenter will hand you, 
there are four factors listed. Please put an X in the space 
which you think best represents how important each factor 
was in determining how well you did. 
The experimenter handed the Attribution Manipulation Check 
(Appendix F) to the subject and returned to the chair on the opposite 
side of the room. 
Measurement of affect. As soon as the manipulation check was 
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completed, which generally took only a moment, the experimenter 
handed the affect measure and instructions for completing it 
(Appendix C) to the subject. Subjects were asked to read the 
instructions and fill it out, and told that they could ask questions 
of the experimenter, who again moved to the other side of the room. 
In fact, no nondepressed subject took more than 10 minutes. 
Anagrams task. The posttest was presented in the same location 
by the same experimenter as the treatment. Although there is 
argument that the helplessness phenomenon becomes interesting only 
as it can be shown to generalize to new situations (Wortman & 
Brehm, 1975), for two reasons this issue was ignored in the present 
study. The first was simplicity. Elaborate deception is required 
to induce subjects to believe that the posttest is part of a 
separate experiment (e.g., Hanusa & Schultz, 1977). This could be 
forgone in the present study for the second reason, that this study 
was unconcerned with generalization of effects. Generalization is 
thought to depend on the stability and globality of attributions 
(Abramson et al., 1978), which were not at issue here. Herein we 
were mainly concerned with achieving helplessness so that its 
attendant affect could be measured. For this reason, the procedure 
of early, successful helplessness studies was closely followed. 
All subjects heard the following tape recorded instructions, 
adapted from Hiroto and Seligman (1975): 
Now we would like for you to solve some anagrams. Anagrams 
are words with the letters scrambled. The problem for you 
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is to unscramble the letters so that they form a word. 
When you've found the word, tell the experimenter what 
it is. Now, there may be a pattern or principle by 
which to solve the anagrams. But that's up to you to 
figure out. We can't answer any questions now. After 
the experiment is over, we will answer all questions. 
Please begin. 
The experimenter used a stopwatch to measure subjects' response 
times, and recorded those times in a notebook held out of the 
subjects' visibility. If subjects gave the correct word, the 
experimenter said, "That's correct. Now try the next one." In 
cases where a subject gave a nonsense word, the experimenter 
replied, "That's not a word. Please try again." Subjects were 
given a maximum of 100 seconds to solve each anagram. At 85 seconds, 
subject were informed that they had 15 seconds left. At 100 
seconds, the experimenter said, "Time is up. Please try the next 
one." The experimenter flipped the cards in the binder immediately 
when subjects correctly solved an anagram, or at the end of the 
100-second interval. Subjects were not allowed to do any writing. 
Additional measures. Subjects were told that there were a 
couple more questionnaires for them to fill out, which were self-
explaining. The experimenter again moved across the room while the 
remaining form (Appendix 6) was completed. 
Debriefing. At this point, subjects were handed a typed 
description of the study which explained the deception as well as 
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the purposes for it (Appendix M). They were probed for suspicion, 
and asked about their degree of familiarity with anagrams. All 
subjects reported little or no such experience. They were given 
credit for their participation, asked not to discuss any aspect of 
the experiment with friends or classmates, and dismissed. 
Design and Analyses 
Two main types of data were collected in the study, anagram 
performance data and affect data. Different types of analyses were 
conducted on the two. 
Anagram data. Anagram performance was measured on four indices 
similar to those used by Klein et al. (1976). These were (a) mean 
response latency, that is, seconds to anagram solution (with times 
of 100 seconds automatically being counted as failures); (b) trials 
to criterion for solution of the anagram pattern, defined as the 
trial number of the third successive trial with a response latency 
of less than 15 seconds, after which every anagram is solved; 
(c) number of failures to solve an anagram within 100 seconds; and 
(d) the conditional probability of solving an anagram given that 
the previous anagram was solved. It might be noted that Klein et 
al. and other researchers defined criterion for solution of the 
anagram pattern as three successive anagram solutions in less than 
15 seconds each. However, in this research, it was obvious that 
subjects could solve three consecutive anagrams and still not have 
learned the solution pattern (i.e., they continued to have failures). 
Therefore, the criterion was modified, as indicated in (b) above. 
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in this study. 
The experimental design relevant to this data was a single-
treatment design with six levels. The six levels consisted of the 
five groups which received different attributions about the 
treatment and the control group. The anagram data were intended 
to serve as a manipulation check to insure that helplessness-
inducing conditions had been achieved, and to compare performance 
effects obtained under various attribution conditions. One-way 
analyses of variance and selected a priori t tests were used to 
analyze the anagram data. 
Affect data. Following Weiner's et al. (1978) methodology, 
analyses of affect data proceeded by first compiling lists of the 
10 affects receiving the highest intensity ratings (principal 
affects) for each of the 7 groups of subjects (the six nondepressed 
groups plus the depressed sample). An extensive series of simple t 
tests was used to compare the principal affects of the various 
groups. Following from Hypotheses 2 and 4, a priori ^ tests 
compared the no-attribution group with the control group, and the 
depressed subjects with the no-attribution group. 
In order to more thoroughly explore the data, a factor analysis 
of the affect measure was planned. It was intended that analyses 
of variance performed on the factors would allow a second means of 
discovering whether different attributions yielded differences in 
the affect of helplessness. 
Other analyses. Additional measures were analyzed by 1-way 
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analyses of variance. These included the attribution manipulation 
check (Appendix F), subjects' estimated number of anagrams 
solved, their self-perceived success on them, and their attributions 
about anagram performance (Appendix G). 
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RESULTS 
Anagram Data 
Subjects' performance on the anagrams was measured on the four 
variables mentioned earlier: mean response latency, number of 
trials to criterion for solution of the anagram pattern, number of 
failures, and conditional probability of solving an anagram given 
that the previous one was solved. The latter measure was calcu­
lated by dividing the total number of solutions, minus one, into 
the number of solutions which followed a solution. 
Results of a priori ;t tests which contrasted the control and 
the no-attribution groups on the four dependent measures show that 
helplessness was not achieved. Means and ^ values are presented in 
Table 2. Although the no-attribution group performed more poorly 
than controls on all four measures, ;t statistics are very small, 
and not significant. 
One-way analyses of variance were used to compare the anagram 
results of the six nondepressed groups (the control group and the 
five groups exposed to insolvable problems, hereafter referred to 
as IP groups). These tests yielded no significant effects. However, 
it will be noted in Table 3 that, without exception, the IP groups 
performed more poorly than the controls. Also, on each dependent 
measure, the effects are greater for groups which received an 
attribution about the failure than for the no-attribution group. 
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Table 2 
Means of Controls and No-attribution "Helpless" Subjects 
on Four Measures of Anagram Performance 
Group® 
Controls No-Attribution 
Performance measure X X SD ^ value^ 
Response latency 34.41 21.36 41.42 24.09 .81 
Trials to criterion 13.86 5.52 14.07 5.01 .11 
Number of failures 5.00 4.08 6.14 4.81 .67 
Conditional proba­
bility of success .82 .16 .80 .25 .24 
= 14 for each group. 
^Degrees of freedom for each test = 26. 
The experimenter trickery group tended to perform the most poorly. 
On two dependent measures, response latency and trials to criterion, 
the results approach significance. 
Tests for sex effects were also conducted. A six (group) by two 
(sex of subject) analysis of variance on each dependent variable 
yielded no significant main effects or interactions. A similar 
analysis (condition by sex of experimenter) yielded no experimenter 
effects. 
Manipulation of Attributions 
A 1-way analysis of variance performed on each item of the 
Table 3 
Anagrams Performance of the Six Nondepressed Groups 
Group 
No Experimenter Task 
Performance measure Control attribution Ability Effort Trickery Di fficul ty F® £ 
Response latency 34.41 41.42 52.29 47.12 58.83 47.77 1.99 .09 
Trials to criterion 13.86 14.07 16.64 17.21 19.00 16.43 2.09 .07 
Number of failures 5.00 6.14 8.29 7.00 8.86 7.07 1.39 .24 
Conditional proba- .82 .80 .67 .66 .62 .69 1.59 .17 
bility of success 
®For each £ test, degrees of freedom = 5 and 78. 
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attribution manipulation check (Appendix E) revealed that the 
experimenters were only partially successful in manipulating 
subjects' attributions for their failures on the Levine discrimina­
tion problems (Levine, 1971). Means and associated statistics are 
presented in Table 4 for the IP groups on each item of the instru­
ment. Results were significant only for the item "something the 
experimenter did," although the results on the task difficulty item 
approached significance. A posteriori Tukey comparisons (Kirk, 
1968) comparisons showed that the group given instructions that the 
experimenter had tricked them cited the "experimenter" item to a 
greater extent than any of the other groups (for each comparison, 
ÇL [65] > 4.82, £ < .01). None of the other groups differed from 
each other on the "experimenter" item. Since the results of the 
task difficulty item were so close to significance, Tukey contrasts 
were used to explore differences between those means as well. Those 
tests showed a significant difference between the no-attribution 
group and the task difficulty group, with the latter citing task 
difficulty much more strongly for their failure, g. (65) = 3.98, 
2 < .05. None of the other groups differed from each other on the 
task difficulty item. Since the no-attribution group would be an 
appropriate group with which to compare other groups about the 
success of the manipulations, it would appear that the experimenters 
were at least "marginally successful" in inducing the task diffi­
culty group to believe that they had failed the discrimination task 
because of its difficulty. 
Table 4 
Scores of the Insolvable-problem Groups on 
Four Measures of Failure Attribution 
Group 
No Experimenter Task 
Attribution item attribution Ability Effort trickery difficulty F* £ 
Effort 4.00 4.50. 3.93 3.21 4.71 1.56 .19 
Task difficulty 3.64 4.86 4.57 4.07 5.50 2.34 .06 
Ability 4.21 4.21 3.57 2.64 4.07 1.83 .13 
Experimenter 1.93 2.36 2.43 6.14 2.14 16.63 .0001 
®For each F_ test, degrees of freedom = 4 and 65. 
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Analyses of Additional Measures 
One-way analyses of variance were performed on the estimated 
number of correctly solved anagrams, subjects' self-rated percep­
tions of success on the anagrams, and on each of four items which 
measured attributions about performance on the anagrams (Appendix 
G). These analyses involved all six of the nondepressed groups 
(controls plus five IP groups). Results, summarized in Table 5, 
did not reach significance on any measure. 
The mean number of actual anagram solutions for each group is 
also given in Table 5, below the estimated number. It will be 
noted that groups were equally accurate in estimating their number 
of solutions, with each underestimating its successes by a margin 
of about two anagrams. 
Means on the success/failure perception item indicate that most 
groups saw their anagram performance as something between a "slight 
success" (rating of 4) and a "slight failure" (rating of 3). 
Ability, effort, and task difficulty were all rated as impor­
tant factors in determining how well people did on the anagrams. 
The experimenter's behavior was not seen as important, even by the 
group which had previously been tricked. The insignificant dif­
ferences between groups on these attribution items indicate, not 
surprisingly, that information given to subjects about the first 
discrimination task did not influence their perceptions about the 
second task. 
Table 5 
Self-reported Perceptions of Anagram 
Performance for all Nondepressed Groups 
Group 
Control 
No 
attribution Abi1i ty Effort 
Task 
difficulty 
Experimenter 
tri ckery F* £ 
Estimated number 
correct" 13.21 11.14 9.93 10.64 9.00 9.93 1.20 .31 
(15.00) (13.86) (11.71) (13.00) (11.14) (12.93) 
Success/failure 
perception 3.93 3.71 3.29 4.21 3.21 3.86 1.23 .30 
Attributions for: 
(a) Effort 4.64 3.79 5.00 5.14 5.29 5.43 2.08 .08 
(b) Task difficulty 5.21 4.50 5.14 5.00 5.36 5.57 1.09 .37 
(c) Ability 4.93 4.79 5.00 5.07 5.71 5.07 .59 .70 
(d) Experimenter 2.36 2.07 2.50 2.36 2.71 1.71 .51 .77 
®For each £ test, degrees of freedom = 5 and 78. 
'^The number in parentheses just below the estimated number of correct anagrams is the actual 
number correct for each group. 
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Affect Data 
Purpose. The purposes for collecting the affect data were 
(a) to isolate the feelings associated with helplessness per se; 
(b) to compare the feelings associated with helplessness under vary­
ing attributions for the helplessness; and (c) to compare the feel­
ings associated with helplessness with the feelings associated with 
depression. 
The main analyses of the affect data were completed as planned. 
However, results should be viewed in light of the facts that help­
lessness was not achieved, and also, with one and possibly two 
exceptions, subjects' attributions about their failures were not 
successfully manipulated. 
Identification of "unknown" affects. The first step in the 
analysis of the affect data was the identification of words on the 
affect measure (Appendix C) which were unknown to ten percent or 
more of the total sample of 122 subjects. Words which were either 
checked (the procedure by which subjects were instructed to indi­
cate unknown words) or left blank were counted as unknowns. Seven 
such words were isolated, including "vindictive," "defected," 
"apathetic," "sullen," "sedate," "woeful," and "wonderment." These 
words are indicated by the superscript "u" in Appendix C, and were 
eliminated from consideration in further analyses. 
Identification of "principal affects." Principal affects were 
defined as the words which received the highest ratings within each 
group. Simple means were generated on each adjective for each of 
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the seven groups in the total sample. The resulting lists were 
scanned, and the ten most highly-rated affects located. Principal 
affects for each group are presented in Table 6. 
Feelings associated with problem failure. It was planned that 
the no-attribution IP group and the control group would be compared 
in order to isolate the affect associated with helplessness per se. 
Simple a priori ;t tests were used to make those comparisons, which 
were done on the principal affects of the no-attribution group. As 
presented in Table 7, the no-attribution group felt more incompe­
tent, flustered, dumbfounded, and marginally (£ < .06) more frus­
trated than the controls. They also felt significantly less 
composed and thoughtful. 
Discriminating and nondiscriminating affects. Discriminating 
and nondiscriminating affects were identified via comparisons in­
volving the principal affects for the five IP groups. (Results of 
the control group and the depressed group were not included in these 
analyses.) The purpose here was to compare the feelings generated 
by different attributions for subjects' failure to solve the dis­
crimination problems. Simple ^ tests were used to compare each 
principal affect for a given group with ratings given that affect by 
the other four groups combined. Discriminating affects were defined 
as those which were rated more highly by one group than by the other 
groups combined. Nondiscriminating affects were defined as those 
which appeared on three or more principal affect lists, but were not 
associated with one list more strongly than others. Originally, the 
•Table 6 
Principal Affects for each Group® 
Depressed group X SD Control group X M 
1. dissatisfied 6.89 2.54 1. composed 6.71 1.14 
2. unsatisfied 6.84 2.21 2. thoughtful 6.43 1.78 
3. frustrated 6.68 2.29 3. calm 6.00 2.00 
4. angry 6.57 1.92 4. anxious 4.29 2.13 
5. worried 6.53 2.43 5. unexcited 4.29 2.13 
6. troubled 6.47 2.38 6. apprehensive 3.71 1.86 
7. unhappy 6.26 2.25 7. indifferent 3.57 2.53 
8. anxious 6.13 2.02 8. passive 3.57 1.99 
9. upset 6.10 2.26 9. humble 3.57 2.24 
10. concern 6.10 2.44 10. aggressive 3.21 2.49 
No-attribution group Ability group 
1. calm 4.57 2.68 1. thoughtful 4.93 1.90 
2. i ricompetent 4.00 2.63 2. calm 4.50 2.62 
3. thoughtful 4.00*t 1.62 3. anxious 4.21 1.72 
4. dissatisfied 3.79 2.22 4. dumbfounded 4.00 2.83 
5. anxious 3.64 2.24 5. flustered 4.00 2.83 
6. fl ustered 3.57 1.83 6. composed 3.93 2.02 
7. unexci ted 3.57 2.21 7. uneasy 3.86 2.63 
8. frustrated 3.50 2.31 8. dissatisfied 3.86 2.93 
9. dumbfounded 3.43 2.95 9. unsatisfied 3.86 3.35 
10. composed 3.43*t 2.38 10. surprised 3.64 2.27 
Effort group X ^ Trickery group X SD 
1. collected 5.71 1.94 1. thoughtful 5.93 2.40 
2. dissatisfied 5.64* 2.31 2. calm 5.93 1.49 
3. composed 5.50 2.59 3. composed 5.43 2.31 
4. calm 5.36 2.65 4. collected 4.86 2.32 
5. thoughtful 5.14 2.21 5. passive 4.79 2.22 
6. unsatisfied 4.86* 3.06 6. surprised 4.36 2.98 
7. anxious 4.79 2.15 7. i ndi fferent 4.29 3.05 
8. incompetent 4.79* 3.09 8. unexci ted 4.21 2.15 
9. apprehensive 4.58** 1.97 9. humble 4.14 2,88 
10. surprised 4.57 3.27 10. anxious 3.93 1.94 
Task difficulty group 
1. calm 6.14 1.99 
2. collected 5.92* 2.22 
3. thoughtful 5.86 1.99 
4. composed 5.50 2.07 
5. passive 5.27* 2.24 
6. anxious 4.71 2.02 
7. dissatisfied 4.50 2.79 
8. indifferent 4.14 2.66 
9. humble 4.00 2.00 
10. resigned 3.90* 2.33 
®For the depressed group, n = 38. For all other groups, n = 14. 
^Discriminating affects at the .05 significance level. 
**Discriminating affects at the .01 significance level. 
^Affects rated significantly lower by group indicated than by all other groups. 
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Table 7 
Comparison of Controls and the No-attribution Group on the 
Principal Affects of the No-attribution Group 
Group 
No 
attribution 
Controls group 
Pri nci pal 
affect X X M £ 
calm 6.00 2.00 4.57 2.68 1.60 .12 
incompetent 1.50 1.29 4.00 2.63 3.19 .004 
thoughtful 6.43 1.78 4.00 1.61 3.77 .0009 
dissatisfied 2.57 2.03 3.78 2.23 1.51 .14 
anxious 4.29 2.13 3.64 2.24 .78 .44 
flustered 2.00 1.36 3.57 1.83 2.58 
C
M
 O
 
unexci ted 4.29 2.13 3.57 2.21 .87 .39 
frustrated 1.93 1.82 3.50 2.31 2.00 .06 
dumbfounded 1.43 .76 3.43 2.95 2.45 .02 
composed 6.71 1.14 3.43 2.38 4.66 .0001 
^Degrees of freedom for each test = 26. 
.01 level was adopted as the significance level necessary to define 
a discriminating affect. However, only one affect reached signifi­
cance by this criterion ("apprehensive," which was rated more highly 
by the effort attribution group). Therefore, in the following 
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paragraphs, discriminating affects at both the .05 level and the .01 
level are presented. 
Nondiscriminating affects. According to the above criteria, 
"calm," "anxious," "thoughtful," and "composed" qualify as non­
discriminating affects. In fact, they appear among the principal 
affects for all five of the IP groups. Additionally, "collected" 
appears on three principal affect lists, and is considered a dis­
criminating affect only at the less conservative .05 level. (It is 
significantly associated with the task difficulty group, ;t = 2.16, 
£ < .04.) 
In addition to qualifying as nondiscriminating affects, these 
five feelings were the most highly rates ones for all IP groups com­
bined. Across the five groups (n = 70), "calm" received a mean 
rating of 5.30, "thoughtful." was rated 5.17, "composed," 4.76; 
"collected," 4.69; and "anxious," 4.26. Only one other word, "dis­
satisfied," was rated higher than 4.0 overall (mean of "dissatis­
fied" = 4.11). Also, at the experimental group level, most of the 
principal affects, and certainly most of the negative ones, were 
rated below 4.50, the midpoint of the rating scale (see Table 6). 
Overall, ratings given to the affects were low, but those given 
negative affects were decidedly lower. It appears that very little 
negative affect was aroused in this study. 
Discriminating affects. Principal affects which were signifi­
cantly associated with one group as compared with the other IP 
groups combined are indicated by asterisks in Table 6. None of the 
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principal affects of the no-attribution group were rated more 
highly by that group than by the others at either the .05 or .01 
level. However, on two, "thoughtful," and "composed," the no-
attribution group scored lower than other groups (they felt less 
thoughtful and composed). 
No affect characterized the ability group more strongly than 
other groups at either the .05 or the .01 level. The effort attri­
bution group reported being more dissatisfied and unsatisfied than 
other groups, and also felt more incompetent (all these at the .05 
level). They also felt more apprehensive {£ < .01). 
For the experimenter trickery group, no discriminating affects 
emerged. However, "passive" bordered on significance (£ < .07), 
with the trickery group tending to feel more passive than other 
groups. Also, the adjective "sedate" was eliminated from considera­
tion because it was unknown to more than ten percent of subjects. 
Had it not been rejected on those grounds, it would have strongly 
distinguished the trickery group. (The mean for "sedate" for this 
group was 4.07, as opposed to 2.17 for the other combined IP groups, 
£ < .001. All 14 of the subjects in the trickery group rated this 
item, though only 46 of the 56 subjects in other IP groups gave it 
a rati ng . ) 
Finally, for the task difficulty group, three adjectives quali­
fied as distinguishing affects at the .05 level. This group 
reported feeling more collected, passive, and resigned than did the 
other combined groups. 
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Affect of Depressed Sample versus Affect of Problem Failure 
As planned, the depressed group and the no-attribution group 
were contrasted on the 10 principal affects of the depressed group. 
The a priori purpose was to contrast the affect of helplessness with 
that of depression. Results, presented in Table 8, show that the 
depressed group scored higher on all of its principal affects than 
the no-attribution group scored on those affects. However, overall, 
depressed persons gave affects much higher ratings than did the IP 
groups, which renders the present result relatively unimportant. 
Factor Analysis 
It was planned that a factor analysis would be performed on the 
affect instrument. However, the depressed sample appeared to have 
scored much higher, overall, on the items than did the IP groups. 
This observation was tested by calculating mean scores across the 
130 items which remained on the affect measure after the "unknowns" 
were dropped. These means, and also the range of average item 
scores for each group, are presented in Table 9. A 1-way analysis 
of variance performed on the mean item scores was significant 
(Fg jjg = 19.30; £ < .0001), and Duncan multiple range testing 
showed that the depressed sample made higher ratings, overall, on 
the affect measure (at £ < .01) than the six other groups. The 
latter groups did not differ from each other. The average rating 
given principal affects by each group is also presented in Table 9. 
The average principal affect rating for the depressed sample was 
also higher than those for other groups, however no statistical 
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Table 8 
Comparison of Depressed and No-attribution Group? 
on the Principal Affects of Depressed Subjects 
Group 
No . 
Depressed attribution 
Principal 
affect X SD X SD £ 
dissatisfied 6.89 2.54 3.79 2.23 4.03 .0002 
unsatisfied 6.84 2.21 2.71 1.94 6.15 .0001 
frustrated 6.68 2.29 3.50 2.31 4.43 .0001 
angry 6.57 1.93 4.00 1.62 4.46 .0001 
worried 6.53 2.44 2.21 1.89 5.98 .0001 
troubled 6.47 2.38 1.92 1.59 6.60 .0001 
unhappy 6.26 2.25 1.43 
If
) CO 
7.79 .0004 
anxious 6.13 2.02 3.64 2.24 3.83 .0001 
upset 6.10 2.26 1.79 1.12 6.81 .0001 
concern 6.10 2.44 2.00 1.57 5.85 .0001 
S = 38. 
•^n = 14. 
^For each test, degrees of freedom equaled 50. 
Table 9 
Means and Related Statistics for Affect Item Ratings 
and for Principal Affects Ratings, by Group 
Mean item score calculated Mean item score calculated 
over 130 items over 10 principal affects 
Min. Max. 
Groupé Mean SD value value Mean 
Depressed 4.12® 1.14 1.93 7.32 6.46 
Control 1.73b .38 1.35 2.54 4.53 
No-attribution 1.80^ .56 1.00 3.01 3.75 
Abi1i ty 2.10^ 1.05 1.37 5.15 4.07 
Effort 2.75b 1.26 1.22 4.83 5.09 
Trickery 2.20^ .92 1.21 4.43 4.78 
Task difficulty 2.20^ .98 1.40 5.29 4.99 
®*^Means with the same superscript do not differ from each other at £ < .05. 
^For the depressed group, n = 38. For all other groups, n = 14. 
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comparisons were done on these ratings. 
One further consideration is not apparent from Table 9, but is 
suggested by Table 6. The highest-rated affects for depressed sub­
jects clearly are negative feelings. In contrast, most IP groups 
gave their highest ratings to words like "calm," "thoughtful," and 
"composed." For any given affect, it is likely that mean differ­
ences are even greater between the depressed and the IP groups than 
Table 9 suggests. 
It was judged that differences between the experimental groups 
of these magnitudes would distort the correlations between items, 
and therefore distort the factors in a factor analysis. Therefore, 
it would have been necessary to delete the depressed sample from the 
factor analysis, which would have reduced the sample size by nearly 
a third, from 122 to 84. The affect measure, after eliminating 
unknown words, consisted of 130 items. In any case, it would have 
been necessary to reduce the number of variables before factoring, 
but the reduced sample size would require a drastic reduction of 
variables. It was not feasible to even approximate the standard 
rule of using ten times the number of subjects as variables 
(Nunnally, 1967); but if a reasonable way to reduce the variable list 
to 30-40 had been available, an exploratory factor analysis may have 
been feasible. 
The data were examined to determine the effect of dropping the 
"trivial" items, those with low means, similarly as Weiner et al. 
(1978) had done. Employing cutoff criteria for trivial items of a 
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mean of less than 2.0 over all 84 nondepressed subjects, and less 
than 3.0 for any particular group resulted in dropping 69 items, 
leaving 61 items in the pool. That number was considered still too 
large for factoring. Raising the cutoff criterion to a whole group 
mean of 2.5 resulted in only four more items being dropped. 
(Twenty-three items had total-group means between 2.0 and 2.5, but 
on most of these, one or more groups scored above 3.0.) It was 
deemed not appropriate to raise the per-group cutoff score above 
3.0, since the highest item scores for some groups were in the 3.0-
3.5 range (see Table 6). 
The affect list might theoretically have been further reduced 
by dropping the items with high means, but, as mentioned above, only 
four item means were above 4.50, and only one item mean fell between 
4.0 and 4.5. To reduce the cutoff ceiling lower would seem to 
restrict the range of item means in the remaining variables to an 
absurd degree. For these reasons, the factor analysis was aban­
doned. 
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DISCUSSION 
The first question which this research set out to address was 
whether the affect of helplessness in fact parallels the affect of 
depression, as is the claim of the helplessness theory of depression. 
The second question was whether attributions mediate affect in help­
lessness. Since helplessness was not successfully induced, neither 
question was addressed. Nevertheless, three sets of results will be 
discussed: anagram performance, attributions about the discrimination 
task, and affect associated with that task. Anagram performance, the 
most thoroughly researched aspect of helplessness to date, is 
discussed first. 
Anagram Performance 
Lack of Helplessness Effects 
In this study, each group which received insolvable problems 
later performed more poorly on the anagrams than the control group, 
however none of the differences reached significance. The no-
attribution group, which was included in order to observe the effects 
of helplessness training per se, exhibited the smallest of these 
nonsignificant changes. The first question which the anagram results 
prompt is why the helplessness effect was not achieved. Procedural 
considerations will be discussed first, and theoretical considerations, 
later. 
Procedural considerations. In the main, the procedure of Hiroto 
and Seligman (1975) was closely followed in this study, in order to 
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maximize the likelihood that the helplessness effect would occur. 
Only two deliberate departures from their procedure were made. 
First, the instructions were modified slightly, and second, the 
attribution manipulation check and affect measure were inserted 
between the first and second tasks. 
Instructions for the discrimination problems used by Hiroto 
and Seligman were expanded somewhat in our study, in ways which 
were intended to make them less confusing. For example, the "dimen­
sions" and "values" involved in the discrimination task were 
explained in somewhat greater detail. Also, the instruction, "In 
a few trials you can learn what the correct value is by this feedback" 
(Hiroto & Seligman, 1975, p. 317) was eliminated. By suggesting that 
the problems are rather easily solvable, this statement sets up 
conditions for an internal attribution for failure, or a case of 
personal helplessness, in Abramson's et al. (1978) terminology. 
We wished, of course, to avoid unwittingly creating such an expecta­
tion. (Helplessness research has been attacked on this very point. 
Blaney, 1977, for example, noted that subjects given helplessness 
treatments are virtually always told that their problems are solvable. 
Therefore, the treatments could as easily be considered esteem 
manipulations as control manipulations.) The deletion of this 
statement cannot account entirely for the lack of significant 
results, however, since our internal-attribution groups (ability and 
effort), which should theoretically have developed personal helpless­
ness, showed insignificantly impaired performance. Another minor 
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change in instructions was eliminating the phrase "As you know" 
before the statement "anagrams are words with the letters scrambled" 
in the instructions preceding the anagrams task (Hiroto & Seligman, 
1975, p. 319). This phrase seemed derogating to Individuals who did 
not already know the meaning of the word "anagram." The net effect 
of these modifications in instructions may have been to make this 
experimental situation less esteem-threatening than Hiroto and 
Seligman's. As shall be discussed later, lowering the perceived 
threat could have influenced our results. 
Another departure from Hiroto and Seligman was the insertion 
of attribution information in the instructions for four groups. This 
in itself should not eliminate the helplessness effect, which has 
been obtained by others (Klein, Pencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; 
Tennen & Eller, 1977) when attribution instructions were given. 
Helplessness effects might have been mitigated by the insertion 
of two paper and pencil measures between the discrimination problems 
and the anagrams. Typically, subjects proceed quickly from one task 
to another. In studies where the second task is held in a different 
room from the first (e.g., Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, & Hibscher, 
1976) helplessness effects often are not found. In the present 
study, subjects completed the four-item attribution manipulation 
check, which generally took only a moment, and the 138-item affect 
measure, which generally took about ten minutes, before they moved 
on to the anagram task. Together, these measures probably were more 
lengthy than those taken in other reported research where helplessness 
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was obtained. For example, the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist 
(Zuckerman et al., 1964) used by Miller and Seligman (1975) and 
other researchers, contains 89 items. Completing the more extensive 
measures used in this study may have disrupted whatever helplessness 
"set" or "state" was created, and weakened the behavioral effect. 
Theoretical considerations. A second line of reasoning about 
the present lack of effects addresses the mechanism assumed to 
underlie helplessness deficits. It was noted in the introduction to 
this study that although problem-solving deficits regularly follow 
exposure to uncontrollable outcomes, the evidence is not conclusive 
that a belief in uncontrol lability underlies those deficits. 
Recently, an alternate explanation for helplessness effects has been 
advanced which may bear on the present discussion. This is the 
"egotism" explanation of Frankel and Snyder (1978). Frankel and 
Snyder proposed that helplessness follows a threat to self-esteem, 
and "helpless" individuals are in fact operating in ways that prevent 
further loss of esteem. Specifically, they proposed that persons 
given insolvable problems do not try on a second task, in order to 
be able to attribute failure to effort, a fairly benign attribution 
in terms of self-esteem. In their study, anagram deficits were 
present after a series of failures on discrimination problems 
when subjects were told that the anagrams were moderately difficult, 
but the deficits were not found when subjects were told that the 
anagrams were very difficult. By the egotism explanation, the 
highly difficult task posed no threat to esteem, and subjects 
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exerted adequate effort, and performed well. 
Other lines of thinking and a growing body of evidence are 
consistent with the egotism theory. Blayney's observation about 
possible esteem manipulation in much of the helplessness literature 
is consistent. Also, in two studies, Sacco and Hokanson (1978; 1982) 
reported that persons treated with inescapable noise performed 
differently on a second task, depending on whether the experimenter 
was present (public situation) or absent and ostensibly ignorant 
of the individual's results (private situation). In each study 
results predicted by helplessness theory were obtained in the public 
situation, but not in the private one. The authors argued that 
deficits associated with helplessness actually reflect subjects' 
attempts to manage interpersonal stress. Helpless subjects actually 
are behaving cautiously, seeking to avoid a negative evaluation by 
others and further loss of esteem (Sacco & Hokanson, 1978). 
Other results reviewed previously could also be understood 
in terms of threats to esteem, and are thus consistent with egotism 
theory. Recall that Roth and Bootzin (1974) found performance 
facilitation after exposure to unsolvable tasks, and proposed a 
curvilinear relationship between performance and amount of exposure 
to, or "impact" of, the uncontrollable outcome. Roth and Kubal (1975) 
tested these ideas. They found that higher importance of the training 
task and high amounts of training increased the likelihood of 
helplessness effects. When the training task was described as a 
"really good predictor of success in college" (p. 683), exposure to 
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50 trials at one insolvable task resulted in performance facilitation, 
but deficits followed exposure to three insolvable tasks with a total 
of 120 trials. When the training task was described simply as "a 
problem in concept formation" (p. 683), the lower exposure produced 
strong facilitation; higher exposure less pronounced, and nonsignifi­
cant facilitation. Thus, only extended failure on the important 
problem produced the usual learning deficits. These authors did 
not offer an explanation for how "impact" of the helplessness 
treatment mediates results, but the possibility of esteem manipulation 
is obvious. 
In a 1977 article, Tennen and Eller pointed out that Roth and 
Kubal had inadvertantly supplied internal attributions to persons 
who received the three tasks, thus confounding attributions with 
amount of helplessness training. Tennen and Eller varied the two 
independently, and found no helplessness after 48 trials, helplessness 
after 96 trials when internal attribution were supplied, and 
facilitation after 96 trials for which external attributions were 
supplied. 
Together, these findings suggest that achieving helplessness may 
require many trials at an unsolvable task (substantially more than 
50) and internal attribution for failure, or some other esteem-
threatening component in the experiment situation. Certainly there 
are studies in the literature in which esteem is not explicitly 
manipulated, or where only about 40 trials are used to create 
helplessness. Most notable are those from Seligman's lab. Generally, 
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however, it is possible to pinpoint esteem-relevant factors in 
the experimental situation. Subjects continue to be routinely 
told that there is something they can do to solve the problem 
(e.g.. Alloy & Abramson, 1982), or the experimenter is present, or 
(as is usually the case) both. There is no evidence to date which 
would refute the egotism explanation of helplessness deficits in 
humans. 
Two other recent studies support the egotism hypothesis. In 
a study designed to pit helplessness theory against the egotism 
explanation, Snyder, Smoller, Strenta, and Frankel (1981) measured 
anagram performance following the typical solvable or insolvable 
discrimination problems. Half of the subjects worked on the anagrams 
in the presence of music said to be distracting. Egotism predicts 
that persons supplied with the music "excuse" for poor performance 
would use adequate effort and perform well. Helplessness theory 
predicts that the distraction would further weaken the expectancy for 
control over outcomes, and further impair performance. As predicted, 
only the no-music group had performance deficits. Distraction, the 
authors stated, improved performance because low effort was no 
longer needed as an excuse for possible failure. 
Finally, Alloy and Abramson (1982) found unexpected results 
when investigating the role of helplessness training on perceived 
controllability over outcomes on a second task. They interpreted 
their results as consistent with egotism theory and imcompatible 
with helplessness theory. Previous research on the perceived 
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relationship between actions and outcomes has shown that normal 
persons exhibit an "illusion of control" (e.g.. Alloy & Abramson, 
1979; Langer, 1975). That is, they act as if objectively uncontrol­
lable events are under their control. Depressed persons, on the 
other hand, accurately perceive noncontingent outcomes. In their 
1982 study. Alloy and Abramson tested subjects given uncontrollable 
problems as well as depressed persons and untreated controls on 
perceived control in a noncontingency learning problem. As expected, 
depressed persons judged control accurately, but the "helpless" 
group, contrary to prediction and like the untreated controls, 
showed a robust illusion of control over positive outcomes. The 
authors concluded that "individuals exposed to uncontrollable 
events in a typical helplessness-induction procedure do not appear 
to be biased toward perceiving response-outcome relationships as 
noncontingent" (p. 1123). It appears that in this statement the 
authors dismiss the cornerstone of helplessness theory! Interest­
ingly, that the behavior of "helpless" subjects did not parallel 
the behavior of depressed persons also led them to question the 
helplessness model of depression. "Whether laboratory-induced 
helplessness and other examples of experimenter-induced failure 
more closely model anxiety, depression, or some other natural 
phenomenon remains to be determined" (p. 1123). As they state, 
their results are consistent with the egotism explanation. Persons 
striving to re-establish self-esteem could be expected to "over­
estimate" their control over later positive outcomes. The evidence 
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in favor of an egotism explanation of the helplessness phenomena 
is strong, to the point that Abramson herself appears to be leaning 
toward it. 
If one accepts the egotism hypothesis for a moment, the lack 
of significant results in this study might be interpreted in terms 
of it. It seems highly plausible that subjects were not sufficiently 
threatened to achieve helplessness. First, as already mentioned, the 
instruction implying that the problems are usually solved was 
deleted, and overall the instructions were modified to make them 
less likely to confuse or offend. Second, only 40 insolvable 
trials were administered, a number which has been insufficient to 
produce helplessness previously, as discussed above. The author 
would recommend that more problems be used in future experiments. 
However, if they are, and especially if instructions are made more 
understandable, the problem itself should be made more complex. Once 
the instructions to the discrimination problem are understood, the 4-
dimensional problem appears to be quite a simple one. As our 
subjects worked on the task, some seemed baffled and confused by it; 
others, however (perhaps half) appeared to understand both the 
instructions and the necessary problem-solving strategy. These 
people seemed surprised and perplexed at the bogus feedback, 
although they did not report suspicion. Often they would spontaneously 
comment that they must not have understood the instructions, or 
that the task must not be as simple as they had thought. A more 
difficult task, perhaps a 5- or 6-dimensional Levine figure would 
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seem necessary to carry the deception over substantially more trials, 
and possibly to create enough distress to result in helplessness. 
A third potential contributing factor to a nonthreatening 
situation in this study was the interpersonal climate, which was 
probably quite a safe and comfortable one. All subjects in the 
study had one, and usually two, phone contacts with the experimenter 
before arriving at the experiment. Most subjects' names were 
drawn from a large list of student volunteers, and initial calls 
were made to them asking if they were interested in participating 
in the study. Also, it was quickly learned that a reminder call 
the night before the scheduled appointment was necessary to insure 
that subjects would show up. During these calls, it was usually 
necessary to give detailed instructions for finding the research 
room. Out of eagerness that subjects show up, the experimenters 
likely came across as remarkably friendly, outgoing, and helpful 
people. Although great pains were taken to present a neutral 
interpersonal situation once the subjects arrived at the experiment, 
we in fact had done everything we could to be nice, and subjects 
probably found us quite disarming. 
The most plausible explanation for our failure to achieve 
a helplessness effect appears to be the combination of factors which 
contributed to making our procedures and experimental situation 
nonthreatening. 
Attributions and Performance 
Since group differences in performance on the anagrams were 
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not significant, comments about those results must be made with 
much caution. However, as noted previously, the results are highly 
consistent in that groups supplied with attributions performed 
more poorly than the no-attribution group, and still more poorly 
than the control group. Most notable is that the experimenter 
trickery group performed worst of all. On every measure, the 
absolute difference in performance between the trickery group 
and the no-attribution group is greater than that between the 
no-attribution group and the control group. This suggests, however 
weakly given the lack of statistical differences, that the effect 
of attributions on performance is more powerful than the effect 
of experiencing uncontrollable outcomes. The role of attributions 
should be carefully considered in future helplessness studies, and 
attributions most certainly should not be allowed to be manipulated 
inadvertently (e.g., Blaney, 1977). 
Manipulation of Attributions for Failure 
Only the external attributions, to experimenter trickery and 
task difficulty were successfully manipulated in the study, and 
the task difficulty effect is rather weak. Observing this, one mi'ght 
ask whether the problem lies in the attribution information 
supplied to subjects or in the measuring instrument. 
Attribution Information 
The present procedure combined methods used by other researchers 
to induce the various attributions, so there was no shortage of 
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attributional information to subjects. Bogus graphs, which were 
successfully used by Klein, Fencil-Morse, and Seligman (1976), 
direct instructions (e.g., "The task is a very difficult one.") 
adapted from Kukla (1972), and extemporaneous experimenter comments 
("Hmmm, I guess you weren't able to process all of that information.") 
similar to those used by Hanusa and Schultz (1977) were all used. 
Hanusa and Schultz and Klein at al. employed manipulation checks 
which showed that their manipulations were generally effective. 
An exception is that Hanusa and Schultz's effort-attribution group 
ranked task difficulty as the most important cause of their 
failure, which was also true of the effort group in the present 
study (see Table 4, p. 64). Subjects have a great deal of internal 
information on how much effort they exert on a given task. In the 
present study, subjects were told that effort was salient, and 
encouraged to try hard. It is expectable that they were quite 
accurately aware of the amount of effort they exerted. Effort may 
be an especially difficult attribution to manipulate. There is 
no apparent reason, however, why ability was not successfully 
manipulated in this study. 
Manipulation Check 
It is possible that attributions were effectively manipulated, 
but the manipulation check did not pick up on them. The "ability" 
and "effort" items showed least sensitivity to the manipulation, 
which could have resulted from the wording of the instructions and 
the instrument. The instructions ask subjects to indicate "how 
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important each factor was in determining how well you did." 
The instruction is followed by four items and 7-point Likert 
scales ranging from "did not determine outcome at all" to 
"extremely important determinant of outcome." Conceivably some 
subjects confused "importance" with the absolute level of the factor 
which influenced the situation. For example, it is straightforward 
to respond to the task difficulty and experimenter items. High 
task difficulty or high experimenter interference explain the task 
failure, so these items are appropriately rated highly, indicating 
their importance. To answer the ability and effort items appro­
priately, however, required subjects to realize that low ability 
or low effort was highly important, and mark the scale in the 
high range. Possibly the slight switch in response set necessary 
to respond correctly induced confusion. This argument is weakened, 
however, by the fact that the ability group was not distinguished 
from other groups on both performance and affect measures. For 
the ability group, at least, it appears that the attribution 
manipulation simply was not effective. 
Nevertheless, it would probably be preferable in future 
research to ask two questions about each attributional factor, one 
addressing the level to which a factor was present (e.g., "how 
much effort did you apply; how difficult was this task?"), and 
one addressing the importance of the factor (how important was 
this to your overall outcome?") to tease out possible confounding. 
It is also possible that a more sensitive instrument could be 
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devised by using a forced-choice response format in the manipulation 
check, which would require subjects to make finer discriminations 
between attributional factors. Hanusa and Schultz allude to 
using "paired comparisons" (p. 608) on their measure. Other 
researchers have asked subjects to divide a specified nimber of 
"points" between the potential attributional factors (e.g., 
Rizley, 1978). This format would prohibit the assigning of high 
importance to all factors, and possibly encourage finer discrimina­
tions. However, one could argue that the more restrictive formats 
do not allow subjects to respond as they actually perceive things 
to be. There is some evidence that people "naturally" form 
relatively complex attributions about events (MacArthur, 1972). 
Affect Results 
Lack of Negative Affect 
This study was primarily concerned with affect in helplessness 
and its determinants. Unfortunately, negative affect was very 
minimally aroused by the insolvable problem treatment. This outcome 
gives credence to the thesis developed earlier, that subjects 
were not sufficiently threatened to develop helplessness. Indeed, the 
adjectives rated most highly by all subjects were "calm," "thoughtful," 
"composed," and "collected." Even these words were rarely rated 
higher than the midpoint of the scale, which suggests that subjects 
didn't feel any of the checklist of emotions very strongly, or else 
were adverse to reporting them. One wonders if a list of positive 
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emotions would have evoked stronger ratings. (Perhaps the experi­
menters provided a more positive situation than we had heretofore 
imagined!) Of course, helplessness theory also states that an 
outcome must be an important one, or highly aversive, to create 
depressed feelings (Abramson et al., 1978). In that we apparently 
did not achieve this condition, the present lack of results is 
not unsupportive of helplessness theory. 
Two considerations must be kept in mind as the affect results 
are discussed. First is that behaviorally, no group developed 
helplessness. The affect results reflect feelings engendered by 
a series of failures, but not helplessness-inducing failures. 
Second, the methodology used herein capitalizes on chance to a 
large degree. The ten highest-rated adjectives within each 
experimental group were isolated, and comparisons performed on those 
adjectives. Chance high ratings would therefore contribute to the 
likelihood that an item would appear among the principal affects 
for a group, whereas chance low ratings would not. This fact, 
coupled with the fact that 70 ;t tests were performed on the affect 
data, dictates that one take a conservative approach to interpreting 
any statistically significant data. 
Feelings Associated with Insolvable Problems 
The study's first hypothesis was that the no-attribution group 
would exhibit greater stress than controls, consisting of divergent 
emotions, but including greater frustration, anxiety, hostility, 
and depression. To an extent this prediction was borne out. 
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Hostility and anxiety were not aroused, relative to controls. 
However, the no-attribution group felt much less thoughtful and 
composed than the control group, and even less than the other 
IP groups when they were combined. The no-attribution group was 
also marginally more frustrated than controls. The strongest 
flavor, however, given the higher ratings of "dumbfounded" and 
"flustered" is one of unpleasant surprise. At a much greater 
intensity this may translate into the first phase of a general 
stress reaction. 
Attribution and Affect Following Insolvable Problems 
It was predicted that the emotions generated by the various 
attributions would roughly correspond with those reported by 
Weiner et al. (1978). In the main, this was not the case, 
although results may have been more similar to Weiner's had our 
attribution manipulations been more successful or helplessness 
been achieved. 
No discriminating affects emerged for the ability group, which 
had been expected to report incompetence or inadequacy. As noted 
earlier, the lack of emotional effects here suggests that this 
manipulation was ineffective. 
The effort attribution group reported more distinguishing 
negative affect than any other group, although they did not report 
shame or guilt. The higher ratings given to "apprehensive" made 
this the only adjective to distinguish a group at the originally-
adopted .01 level of significance. This group also felt more 
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dissatisfaction and incompetence than other groups. These results 
suggest that the internal attribution of effort may engender 
more stress than other attributions. 
The experimenter trickery group showed no hostility at all, 
contrary to prediction. This group seemed especially unaroused and 
indifferent in their affect ratings. Recall that this group 
performed most poorly of all groups on the anagrams (though 
nonsignificantly). Possibly the indifference they reported after 
the training task extended to the anagrams and depressed their 
performance there. 
Finally, the task-difficulty group reported more collectedness, 
passivity, and resignation than other groups. This offers support 
for the hypothesis that this group would exhibit a lack of involvement, 
a result which is consistent with Weiner's et al. (1978) finding 
that "unexcited" and "thoughtful" were among the discriminating 
affects for their task-difficulty group. It appears that our 
subjects, when encountered with failure on a task which apparently 
held low importance, and which was either extremely difficult or 
involved an interfering experimenter, reacted with low emotional 
involvement, and simply waited it out. 
Other investigators of attributions in helplessness (e.g., 
Pittman & Pittman, 1979; Hanusa & Schultz, 1977) have interpreted 
their findings in terms of the blend of reactance theory (Brehm, 
1966; 1972) and helplessness theory which was proposed by Wortman 
and Brehm in 1975. Wortman and Brehm proposed that small amounts of 
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exposure to uncontrollability lead to reactance; that is, to 
motivational arousal, attempts to re-establish control, and hostility 
and aggression. More extensive exposure to uncontrollability leads 
to the passivity and performance deficits of helplessness. The 
reactance phenomena occur only when one has a prior expectancy for 
control over the threatened outcome. If there is no prior expectancy 
for control, the reactance phase is bypassed and helplessness rather 
quickly ensues. Both reactance and helplessness are seen as 
dependent on the importance of the outcome, however, and are 
proportional to it. Loss of control over an unimportant outcome 
creates neither reactance nor helplessness. 
Subjects in the present study demonstrated neither reactance 
(facilitated anagram performance, and hostility) nor helplessness. 
By this theory as well as egotism theory, it would appear that 
lack of importance or "goal attractiveness" (Weiner et al., 1971) 
of success on the discrimination problems is the most plausible 
explanation for our overall lack of effects. 
Importance of the Training Task 
We might speculate briefly on why the helplessness training 
task apparently held such low importance for the present subjects. 
The issus of a relatively small amount of helplessness training 
and other esteem-relevant factors have already been discussed. In 
addition, the present instructions stressed the importance of the 
task in terms of its importance to science. The experimenters' 
interest in studying these "important questions" was emphasized. 
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and our subjects were urged to do their best. In contrast, other 
researchers have told subjects that the training task is a predictor 
of success in college (Roth & Kubal, 1975); that if they do their 
best on the task, in the experimenters' judgement, they will 
receive additional credit for participating (Pittman & Pittman, 1979); 
or that the experiment relates "perceptual aptitude and intelligence" 
(Snyder et al., 1981); and furthermore, that perceptual skill is 
an important predictor of intelligence (Frankel & Snyder, 1978). 
It is likely that these instructions are more ego-involving, 
and thus enhance the perceived importance of the task more than 
our entreaty on behalf of the advancement of knowledge. However, 
all of the instructions above also suggest an internal attribution 
for the ensuing failure—specifically, to ability or effort. One 
potential way of increasing involvement without making implications 
about causality for failure would be to tell subjects they will 
be rewarded with money or extra credit points for every discrimination 
problem which they solve. A study in which task importance and 
attributions about performance were crossed factors would be an 
interesting one, and may provide data relevant to the Wortman and 
Brehm (1975) reactance/helplessness explanation, the egotism 
explanation (Frankel & Snyder, 1978), and the learned helplessness 
explanation (Abramson et al., 1978) for the performance deficits 
which sometimes follow exposure to insolvable problems. 
Affect of Depression Versus Affect of Helplessness 
Not surprisingly, the depressed sample in this study reported 
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much more negative affect than the relatively unaffected experimental 
groups. Although it was impossible to compare the quality of emotion 
reported by depressives with the quality of emotion in helplessness 
in this study, this issue remains an important one. Helplessness 
researchers to date have not shown that helpless subjects feel like 
actual depressed persons, although they often perform similarly on 
anagram problems (e.g., Klein et al., 1976). Depression, like 
helplessness training, manifests itself in poor anagram performance, 
but presumably having the flu, having just passed one's final oral 
exam, or having run a marathon could have similar effects. Substan­
tiating the helplessness theory of depression requires that an 
emotional parallel be demonstrated. Contrary to the interpretation 
of some writers (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978), this is not 
accomplished by research which reports all manner of disturbed 
affect accompanying helplessness. Substantiation requires that 
helpless subjects and a criterion group of depressed persons respond 
similarly to the same instrument, and differently than nondepressed • 
controls. Since there is a general lack of consensus on the 
definition of depression, its emotional component notwithstanding 
(Depue & Monroe, 1978), the instrument in question needs to survey 
the spectrum of emotions, ideally even positive ones. 
Finally, substantiation of the helplessness theory of 
depression requires more than the demonstration of behavioral 
and emotional similarities between helplessness and depression. 
The factors which appear to influence laboratory helplessness—amount 
99 
of exposure to unsuccessful outcomes, attributions (including 
when they occur), task importance, prior expectancy for control, 
esteem variables—must be clarified. Only then can the role of 
these factors be investigated relative to depression, in the 
laboratory and naturalistic settings, and the theory stand, fall, 
or simply fade away. 
100 
REFERENCES 
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. A. Learned 
helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 49-74. 
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. Judgment of contingency in depressed 
and nondepressed students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 1979, 108, 441-485'. 
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. Learned helplessness, depression, 
and the illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 1982, 4^, 1114-1126. 
Beck, A. T. Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical 
aspects. New York: Hoeber, 1967. 
Beck, A. T. Cognitive therapy and emotional disorders. New York: 
International Universities Press, 1976. 
Benson, J. S., & Kennelly, K. J. Learned helplessness: The result 
of uncontrollable reinforcements or uncontrollable aversive 
stimuli? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 
34, 138-145. 
Blaney, P. H. Contemporary theories of depression: Critique and 
comparison. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1977, 203-223. 
Brehm, J. W. ,A theory of psychological reactance. New York: 
Academic Press, 1966. 
Brehm, J.W. Responses to loss of freedom: A theory of psychological 
reactance. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972. 
Bumberry, W., Oliver, J. M., & McClure, J. N. Validation of the 
Beck Depression Inventory in a university population using psychia­
tric estimate as criterion. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 1978, 150-155. 
Cohen, S., Rothbart, M., & Phillips, S. Locus of control and the 
generality of learned helplessness. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1976, 34, 1049-1056. 
Cole, E. S. & Coyne, J. C. Situation specificity of laboratory-
induced "learned helplessness." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
1977, 86, 615-623. 
101 
Costello, C. G. A critical review of Seligman's laboratory 
experiments on learned helplessness and depression in humans. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 21-31. 
Depue, R. A., & Monroe, S. M. Learned helplessness in the 
perspective of the depressive disorders: Conceptual and defini­
tional issues. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 3-20. 
Elig, T. W, & Frieze, I. H. A multi-dimensional scheme for coding 
and interpreting perceived causality for success and failure 
events: The Coding Scheme of Perceived Causality (CSPC). SAS 
Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 1975, _5, 313. 
Feather, N. T. & Simon, J. G. Causal attributions for success 
and failure in relation to expectations of success based upon 
selective or manipulative control. Journal of Personality, 
1971, 527-541 . 
Fosco, E. ,& Geer, J. H. Effects of gaining control over aversive 
stimuli after differing amounts of no control. Psychological 
Reports. 1971, 29, 1153-1154. 
Frankel, A. & Snyder, M. Poor performance following unsolvable 
problems: Learned helplessness or egotism? Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1978, 36, 1415-1423. 
Freud, S. Mourning and melancholia. In Collected Papers. London: 
Hogarth Press Lts., 1956. (Originally published, 1917). 
Frieze, I.H. Causal attributions and information seeking to 
explain success and failure. Journal of Research in Personality, 
1976, 10, 293-305. 
Gatchel, R. J., Paulus, P. B., & Maples, C. W. Learned helplessness 
and self-reported affect. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1975, 
84, 732-734. 
Gatchel, R. J. & Proctor, J. D. Physiological correlates of 
learned helplessness in man. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
1976, 85, 27-34. 
Glass, D. C. & Singer, J. E. Urban stress: Experiments on noise 
and social stressors. New York: Academic Press, 1972. 
Hamilton, M. A. A rating scale for depression. Journal of 
Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry. 1960, 56-62. 
Hanusa, B. H., & Schultz, R. Attributional mediators of learned 
helplessness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1977, 35, 602-6117 
102 
Hiroto, D. Locus of control and learned helplessness. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology, 1974, 102, 187-193. 
Hiroto, D., & Seligman, M. E. P. Generality of learned helplessness 
in man. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 
31, 311-327. 
Huesman, L. R. Cognitive processes and models of depression. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 194-198. 
Kirk, R. E. Experimental design: Procedures for the behavioral 
sciences. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1968. 
Klein, D. C., Fencil-Morse, E., & Seligman, M. E. P. Learned 
helplessness, depression, and the attribution of failure. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976, 508-516. 
Klein, D. C., & Seligman, M. E. P. Reversal of performance deficits 
in learned helplessness and depression. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology. 1976, 11-26. 
Kraepelin, E. Manic-depressive insanity and paranoia (M. Barclay, 
trans.). Edinburgh: E & S Livingston, Ltd., 1921. 
Krantz, D. S., Glass, D. C., & Snyder, M. L. Helplessness, stress 
level, and the coronary prone behavior pattern. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10., 284-300. 
Kukla, A. Attributional determinants of achievement-related 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1972, 
21, 166-174. 
Langer, E. J. The illusion of control. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 311-3291 
Lavelle, T. L., Metal sky, G. I., & Coyne, J. C. Learned helplessness, 
test anxiety, and acknowledgement of contingencies. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 1979, 381-387. 
Levine, M. Hypothesis behavior by humans during discrimination 
learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1966, 71, 331-338. 
Levine, M. Hypothesis theory and nonlearning despite ideal S-R 
reinforcement contingencies. Psychological Review, 1971, 
78, 130-140. 
MacArthur, L. A. The how and what of why: Some determinants 
and consequences of causal attribution. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology. 1972, 171-193. 
103 
Maier, S. F. Failure to escape traumatic shock: Incompatible 
skeletal motor response or learned helplessness? Learning 
and Motivation, 1970, 1_, 157-170. 
Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. P. Learned helplessness: Theory 
and evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
1976, 105, 3-46. 
Maier, S. F., & Testa, T. J. Failure to learn to escape by rats 
previously exposed to inescapable shock is partly produced by 
associative interference. Journal of Comparative and Physio­
logical Psychology, 1975, 554-564. 
Masserman, J. H. Behavior and Neurosis. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1943. 
Miller, W. R. & Seligman, M. E. P. Depression and the perception 
of reinforcement. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1973, 82, 
62-73. 
Miller, W. R. & Seligman, M. E. P. Depression and learned helpless­
ness in man. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1975, M, 228-238. 
Miller, W. R. ,& Seligman, M. E. P. Learned helplessness, depression, 
and the perception of reinforcement. Behavior Research and 
Therapy. 1976, 14, 7-17. 
Miller, W. R., Seligman, M. E. P., & Kurlander, H. M. Learned 
helplessness, depression, and anxiety. Journal of Nervous 
and Mental Disease. 1975, 161, 347-357. 
Nisbett, R. E.. Borgida, E., Crandall, R., & Reed, H. Popular 
induction: Information is not always informative. In J. 
Carroll & J. Payne (Eds.), Cognition and Social Behavior. 
Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum, 1976. 
Nunnally, J. C. Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. 
Overmier, J. B., & Seligman, M. E. P. Effects of inescapable shock 
upon subsequent escape and avoidance responding. Journal of 
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1967, 6^, 28-33. 
Pittman, N. L. & Pittman, T. S. Effects of amount of helplessness 
training and internal-external locus of control on mood and 
performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
1979, 37, 39-47. 
Price, K. P., Tryon. W. W., & Raps, C. S. Learned helplessness and 
depression in a clinical population: A test of two behavioral 
hypotheses. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978,^, 113-121. 
104 
Rizley, R. Depression and distortion in the attribution of 
causality. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 87^, 32-48. 
Rodin, J. Density, perceived choice, and response to controllable 
and uncontrollable outcomes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 1976, J2_, 564-578. 
Roth, S. & Bootzin, R. R. The effects of experimentally induced 
expectancies of external control: An investigation of learned 
helplessness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1974, 29, 253-264. 
Roth, S. & Kubal, L. The effects of noncontingent reinforcement 
on tasks of differing importance: Facilitation and learned 
helplessness effects. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1975, 32, 680-691. 
Sacco, W. P. & Hokanson, J. E. Expectancies of success and anagram 
performance of depressives in a public and private setting. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 122-130. 
Sacco, W. P. & Hokanson, J. E. Depression and self-reinforcement 
in a public and a private setting. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 1982, 42, 377-385. 
Schwab, J. J., Bialow, M., Martin, P. C., & Clemmons, R. The use 
of the Beck Depression Inventory with medical inpatients. 
Psychosomatics, 1965, 273-277. 
Seligman, M. E. P. Helplessness; On depression, development, and 
death. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975. 
Seligman, M. E. P. & Maier, S. F. Failure to escape traumatic 
shock. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1967, 74, 1-9. 
Seligman, M. E. P., Maier, S. F., & Geer, J. H. Alleviation 
of learned helplessness in the dog. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology. 1968, 73, 256-262. 
Seligman, M. E. P., Maier, S. F., & Solomon,R. L. Unpredictable 
and uncontrollable aversive events. In F. R. Brush, (Ed.), 
Aversive conditioning and learning. New York: Academic Press. 
1971. 
Snyder, M. L., Smoller, B., Strenta, A., & Frankel, A. A comparison 
of egotism, negativity, and learned helplessness as explanations 
for poor performance after unsolvable problems. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology. 1981, 40, 24-30. 
105 
Task Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1980. 
Teasdale, J. D. Effects of real and recalled success on learned 
helplessness and depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
1978, 155-164. 
Tennen, H. & Eller, S. J. Attributional components of learned 
helplessness and facilitation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1977, 35, 265-271. 
Thornton, J. W. & Jacobs, P. D. Learned helplessness in human 
subjects. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1971,^, 367-372. 
Tresselt, M. E., & Mayzner, M. S. Normative solution times for a 
sample of 134 solution words and 378 associated anagrams. 
Psychonomic Monograph Supplements, 1966, 293-298. 
Weiner, B. Achievement motivation and attribution theory. 
Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1974. 
Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, 
F. M. Perceiving the causes of success and failure. In E. E. 
Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Val ins, 
and B. Weiner, (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of 
behavior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1971. 
Weiner, B., Russell, D., & Lerman, D. Affective consequences of 
causal ascriptions. In J. H. Harvey, Wm. Ickes, and R. F. Kidd 
(Eds.), New directions in attribution research. Vol. 2. 
Hi 11sdale, N. J.: Erlbaum Associates, 1978. 
Weiss, J. M. Effects of coping responses on stress. Journal of 
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1968, 65, 251-260. 
Weiss, J. M. Effects of coping behavior in different warning 
signal conditions on stress pathology in rats. Journal of 
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1971, 77, 1-13.~ (a) 
Weiss, J. M. Effects of coping behavior with and without a feedback 
signal on stress pathology in rats. Journal of Comparative and 
Physiological Psychology, 1971, 77, 22-30. [b] 
Weiss, J. M. Effects of punishing the coping response (conflict) 
on stress pathology in rats. Journal of Comparative and Physio­
logical Psychology, 1971 , 77, 14-21. [c] 
Williams, J. G., Barlow, D. H., & Agras, W. S. Behavioral measure­
ment of severe depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 1972, 
27, 330-333. 
106 
Willis, R. N. & Blaney, P. H. Three tests of the learned helpless­
ness model of depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1978, 
131-136. 
Wortman, C. B. & Brehm, J. W. Responses to uncontrollable outcomes: 
An integration of reactance theory and the learned helplessness 
model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 8). New York: Academic Press, 1975. 
Wortman, C. B. & Dintzer, L. Is an attributional analysis of the 
learned helplessness phenomenon viable?: A critique of the 
Abramson-Seligman-Teasdale reformulation. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 1978, 87, 75-90. 
Wortman, C. B., Panciera, L., Shusterman, L., & Hibscher, J. 
Attributions of causality and reactions to uncontrollable 
outcomes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 
Ji, 301-316. 
Zuckerman, M., Lubin, B., Vogel., & Valerius, E. Measurement 
of experimentally induced affects. Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, 1964, 28, 418-425. 
107 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Credits are due to my co-major professors, Judy Krulewitz and 
Fred Borgen, for patience, support, and guidance throughout my 
doctoral training, as well as with this dissertation; to my 
committee. Brent Bruton, Dave Edwards, Harry Lando, and Bob 
Strahan for their professional modeling and inputs and collégial 
manner; to Lucia Gilbert, my earliest and most important role model 
as scientist-therapist-mother-genuine human being; to Andrea 
for tolerating her mother's absence and stress; to the Student 
Counseling Center at the University of Idaho for providing 
certain time "off," and computer time; to Craig Brodahl, ny 
dedicated and conscientious co-experimenter; to Harold for 
encouragement; to Tori and Joan for child-sitting; and to 
myself for the phenomenal perseverance which this project has 
requi red. 
PLEASE NOTE: 
Copyrighted materials in this document 
have not been filmed at the request of 
the author. They are available for 
consultation, hov/ever, in the author's 
university library. 
These consist of pages: 
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY (APPENDIX A PAGES 108-111) 
AFFECT MEASURE (APPENDIX C PAGES 113-115) 
ANAGRAMS AND SOLUTION WORDS (APPENDIX D PAGE 116) 
ORIGINAL ANAGRAMS AND SOLUTION WORDS (APPENDIX E PAGE 117) 
University 
Microfilms 
International 
300 N Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 (313) 761-4700 
112 
APPENDIX B . 
Sample Discrimination Problem Card 
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APPENDIX F 
Attribution Manipulation Check 
1. Effort, or how hard I tried 
Did not 
determine 
outcome at 
all 
Moderately 
important 
determi nant 
of outcome 
Extremely 
important 
determi nant 
of outcome 
2. Difficulty of the task 
Did not 
determine 
outcome at 
all 
Moderately 
important 
determinant 
of outcome 
Extremely 
important 
determinant 
of outcome 
3. My ability 
Did not 
determine 
outcome at 
all 
Moderately 
important 
determinant 
of outcome 
Extremely 
important 
determinant 
of outcome 
4. Something the experimenter did 
Did not 
determine 
outcome at 
all 
Moderately 
important 
determinant 
of outcome 
Extremely 
important 
determinant 
of outcome 
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APPENDIX G 
Additional Questionnaire 
On the task which you just completed, there were 20 anagrams 
(words with the letters scrambled). Of the 20, what is your guess 
of the number which you .solved? Please write that number in the 
blank. 
How successful do you consider your performance on the anagram 
task to be? Please check the appropriate space on this scale: 
complete moderate slight slight moderate complete 
failure failure failure success success success 
On the next page are some factors which may have influenced 
your performance on the anagrams task, again, the task you just 
completed. Please put an X in the space which you think best 
represents how important each factor was in determining how will you 
did at solving the anagrams. 
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APPENDIX H 
Informed Consent Form for Counseling Center Clients 
To the client: 
As part of my doctoral research, I am asking Student Counseling 
Center clients who are referred for testing to complete some 
additional questionnaires. Your participation in this research 
is totally voluntary. If you are willing to complete the question­
naires, which takes about 15 minutes, your results will be forwarded 
to your counselor for interpretation to you, or I will be available 
to do the interpretation for you. For my research purposes your 
results will be treated with complete confidentiality. Your 
name will never be associated with your results in the research. 
If you agree to participate in my study, please sign your 
name below. Thank you. 
Elaine Johnson, Counselor 
•Student Counseling Center 
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APPENDIX I 
Informed Consent Form for Psychology Department Subjects 
The Department of Psychology supports the practice of protection 
for Riman subjects participating in research. The following 
information is provided so that you can decide whether you wish 
to participate in the present study. You should be aware that 
even if you agree to participate you are free to withdraw at any 
time, without penalty. 
This study is concerned with problem-solving and feelings. 
You will be asked to solve some intellectual problems, and to 
fill out some questionnaires concerning your feelings. 
Your participation is solicited, but is strictly voluntary. 
Do not hesitate to ask any questions about the study. Be assured 
that your name will not be associated in any way with the research 
findings. We appreciate your cooperation very much. 
Sincerely, 
Elaine Johnson, 
Principal Investigator 
Signature of student agreeing to participate 
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APPENDIX J 
Bogus Feedback Graph used in 
Task Difficulty Attribution Condition 
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APPENDIX K 
Bogus Feedback Graph used in 
Abi1ity Attribution Condition 
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APPENDIX L 
Bogus Feedback Graph used in 
Effort Attribution Condition 
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APPENDIX M 
Debriefing Statement 
The experiment in which you just participated is actually 
a test of one of the major theories of depression in humans. 
The broad issues which we are trying to address are what depression 
is, what causes it, and eventually, what the most effective 
psychological treatments of it are. 
In this experiment we are testing the learned helplessness 
theory of depression. As you may have learned in your psychology 
class, when animals or humans are given a series of insolvable 
problems, later, on solvable problems, they do not perform well. 
They behave as if they have learned that they are helpless on such 
tasks. Martin Seligman, who created the "learned helplessness" 
idea, believes that in humans, depression is very similar to 
learned helplessness. He believes that if people are given 
insolvable problems in the laboratory, they experience a mini 
version of depression in the laboratory. 
That is what we are doing in this experiment. The first set 
of problems, the "pattern discrimination test," was actually 
insolvable. You could not have solved any of those problems. 
We are mainly interested in what feelings you experienced after 
you attempted those problems. (Some of you served as "controls." 
You were not asked to actually "solve" the problems. You are the 
group against which the other groups will be compared.) The 
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feelings you reported following your attempt at the unsolvable 
problems will be compared with feelings reported by persons who 
are depressed. 
We expect that people who attempt insolvable problems will 
not do as well on the anagrams as the controls, who did not try 
to solve those problems. 
Thank you for participating. You will receive 1 hour of 
credit toward your psychology grade. We have an important request 
to make of you. We will be running this experiment for the rest of 
the semester, and possibly for the rest of the year. It is extremely 
important to us that you not discuss this experiment with any of 
your friends. We will be asking many more people to participate. 
Obviously our results would be worthless if the students in our 
study were aware that the first task is insolvable, or knew the 
solution to the second task, the anagrams task. Therefore, we 
are relying on your complete cooperation in maintaining the 
confidentiality of our procedures. 
This research is the final requirement for my PhD degree 
in psychology from Iowa State University. Thank you for your 
help and cooperation. 
Elaine Johnson 
Counselor, 
University of Idaho 
Craig Brodahl 
Research assistant 
